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Mean-Dispersion Preferences and Constant
Absolute Uncertainty Aversion.￿
Abstract
We axiomatize, in an Anscombe-Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation
of the form V (f) = ￿￿￿(d), where ￿ is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability,
d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and ￿(d) is a measure of (aversion
to) dispersion that corresponds to an uncertainty premium. The key feature of these mean-dispersion
preferences is that they exhibit constant absolute uncertainty aversion. This class includes many well-
known models of preferences from the literature on ambiguity. We show what properties of the dispersion
function ￿(￿) correspond to known models, to probabilistic sophistication, and to some new notions of
uncertainty aversion.
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￿This paper subsumes parts of two earlier papers, ￿Generalized Variational Preferences￿ (2007) and ￿Mean-
Dispersion Preferences￿ (2008) which also dealt with the case of non-constant uncertainty aversion. We thank
Don Brown, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Bob Chambers, Rose-Anne Dana, Eddie Dekel, Jurgen Eichberger, Tzachi
Gilboa, David Kelsey, Ali Khan, Peter Klibano⁄, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci, Boris Mordukhovich,
Sujoy Mukerji, John Quiggin, Aldo Rustichini, Zvi Safra, Chris Shannon, Marciano Siniscalchi, Tomas Strzalecki,
Peter Wakker, and Joel Watson.1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider an agent who dislikes uncertainty in the sense that she dislikes variation
in utility across states. Speci￿cally, we investigate preferences over Anscombe-Aumann acts that
￿t the following model
V (f) = ￿(f;￿) ￿ ￿(d(f;￿)),
￿(f;￿) := E￿ (U ￿ f) is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a probability ￿, U is a von-
Neumann Morgenstern expected utility function, and d(f;￿) is the vector of deviations from the
mean given by ds := U (f (s)) ￿ ￿(f;￿). Where no confusion arises, we will omit the dependence
of ￿ and d on f and ￿.
The interpretation is that the agent with these preferences dislikes dispersion. Similar to the
subjective expected utility agent, she forms a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility function
U to evaluate lotteries, forms a prior ￿ and calculates the mean (expected) utility ￿ of the act
according to this prior. But she then deducts from this mean an amount ￿(d) that depends only
on the state-by-state deviations ds from that mean. We can think of the function ￿ as an index
of dispersion aversion if ￿ ￿ 0 or dispersion loving if ￿ < 0. More speci￿cally, for each act f, let
xf be a certainty equivalent, a constant act such that xf ￿ f. Then the dispersion measure ￿(d)
for the act f is given by ￿ ￿ U (xf), the utility di⁄erence between the mean and the certainty
equivalent. It is the reduction in expected utility the agent would be willing to accept in return for
removing all the state-contingent utility uncertainty associated with the act. Drawing an analogy
from risk premiums, we can think of ￿(d) as an absolute uncertainty premium. We call this model
mean-dispersion preferences.
The standard mean-variance model (expressed in terms of utilities) is an example of such
preferences. But we could think of other candidate dispersion measures (standard deviation,
mean absolute deviation, generalized Gini indices, etc.) each expressing a di⁄erent attitude toward
dispersion.1 What all these models have in common is that the uncertainty premium ￿(d) does
not depend on the mean level of utility. In this sense, these models all display constant absolute
1 All these examples are (second-order) probabilistically sophisticated but, as we will see below, mean-dispersion
preferences need not be.
1uncertainty aversion.
Constant uncertainty aversion might be considered as strong a restriction as is constant risk
aversion. As agents become better o⁄ overall, we might perhaps expect them to be willing to
pay less to remove all uncertainty. Several recent models move away from assuming constant
uncertainty aversion, for example Klibano⁄ et al. (2005), Cerreia-Vioglio et al (forthcoming) and
the companion to this paper, Grant et al (2011). But much of the literature at least implicitly
assumes constant uncertainty aversion.
Here we axiomatize the entire class of such preferences. This is theorem 1 below. To allow for
uncertainty aversion, in common with much of the literature, we drop the independence axiom
and replace it with something weaker. In our case, as the discussion above suggests, the key axiom
is the analog of assuming constant absolute risk aversion: if a random variable is preferred to a
sure outcome then adding the same constant to both maintains the preference. In the context of
Anscombe-Aumann acts, the analogous axiom needs to be expressed in terms of mixtures, but
the idea is the same. The resulting axiom is very closely related to the key axiom in Maccheroni
et al (2006a)￿ s variational preference model, and indeed we will show that variational preferences
are a special case of mean-dispersion preferences.2
Many models of ambiguity aversion suggest the appealing interpretation that the agent is
unsure as to the true prior and is either cautious or thinks she is playing a game against a
malevolent nature. For example, in the multiple-prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the
agent evaluates an act according to the criterion
V (f) = min
p2C
P
s U (f (s))ps
where C is a convex subset of possible priors, inviting the interpretation that these are the prob-
abilities that the agent thinks possible and that nature picks the least favorable of these for the
given act. In the more general variational preference model, the agent evaluates an act according
to the criterion




s U (f (s))ps + c(p))
2 For full disclosure, we should say that we were inspired by and started from the case of variational preferences.
2where c is a convex, grounded function, inviting the interpretation that if nature picks a less
plausible prior p then she must pay a larger compensation c(p) back to the agent.
Our model invites the more prosaic interpretation that the agent simply dislikes variation in
utility across states. The shape of the function ￿captures the degrees to which particular forms
of dispersion cause disutility to the agent. Thus variance re￿ ects one way in which dispersion
harms the agent, and generalized Gini indices re￿ ect others. The shape of the dispersion function
may have nothing to do with indeterminacies in the agent￿ s underlying beliefs. In fact, in both
these examples the agent is (second-order) probabilistically sophisticated and, as such, might be
thought to have no indeterminacy in belief.
But the shape of the dispersion function might re￿ ect belief indeterminacy and hence capture
behavior commonly associated with ambiguity. States need not be treated symmetrically. For
example, in the Ellsberg single-urn experiment where the agent knows that a third of the balls are
red but does not know the proportions of blue and green balls, the mean-dispersion agent might
choose a uniform ￿ to calculate the mean utility, and then not care at all about dispersion across
the events ￿ red￿or ￿ not-red￿holding the mean ￿xed, but greatly dislike dispersion across ￿ blue￿
and ￿ not blue￿ .3
Since the dispersion function ￿ can be quite general, the mean-dispersion model can accommo-
date a wide variety of preferences as long they exhibit constant absolute uncertainty aversion. In
particular, many known classes of preferences that admit representations with appealing ambiguity
interpretations also admit mean-dispersion representations. For example, the multiple-prior, Cho-
quet expected utility, invariant biseparable, variational preference and vector expected-utility mod-
els each exhibit constant absolute uncertainty aversion and hence each admits a mean-dispersion
representation.4 In section 3, we show what properties of ￿correspond to each of the preferences
listed above and to what axioms on the underlying preferences.











These preferences are also an example of Siniscalchi￿ s (2009) VEU model. The general relationship is given in
corrolary 3 below.
4 See respectively: Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); Schmeidler (1989); Ghirardato et al (2004); Maccheroni et al
(2006); and Siniscalchi (2009). The latter model is already expressed as a mean and an ￿ adjustment￿ .
3The fact that these classes of preferences concerning ambiguity can also be represented as
mean-dispersion preferences raises issues of interpretation. To recall, one natural cognitive in-
terpretation of multiple-prior preferences is that the agent is unsure as to the true prior and so,
cautiously, always evaluates acts according to the least favorable prior that she considers possible.
The corresponding mean-dispersion representation suggests another cognitive interpretation of the
same preferences: the agent has just one prior but is simply averse to dispersion across states.
Her dispersion function ￿ just happens to take a particular form that corresponds to multiple
priors. That the same data (i.e., preferences) can be explained by two di⁄erent models that invite
di⁄erent interpretations is perhaps less of a concern if the mean-dispersion model that corresponds
to a particular ambiguity model involves a rather baroque or implausible dispersion function. For
example, in the dispersion function we sketched above to explain the Ellsberg experiment, it seems
implausible that dislike of dispersion would have this particular shape unless it re￿ ected some-
thing about underlying ambiguity about the number of green balls. But the restrictions on ￿ that
correspond to the general models above are relatively natural. For example, the mean-dispersion
representations that correspond to general multiple-prior preferences are those with ￿ restricted
to be non-negative, convex and linear homogeneous; properties shared, for example, by dispersion
indices like mean-absolute deviation, standard deviation, the absolute Gini deviation, and all of
the ￿ generalized deviations￿introduced into ￿nance by Rockafellar et al. (2006). We present these
and other examples in section 4.
A problem with the general mean-dispersion model axiomatized in theorem 1 is that, without
putting more structure on the shape of the dispersion functions ￿, it is not possible to uniquely
identify the (single) prior ￿ that the agent is using to calculate the mean. We show in section 5,
however, that as we add more structure on ￿, some identi￿cation of ￿ is possible. In some cases,
we can identify ￿ uniquely; for example, when preferences are dispersion averse (i.e., ￿ ￿ 0) and
smooth around certainty, and we provide conditions on the underlying preferences to ensure such
smoothness.5
5 Another case in which ￿ is uniquely identi￿ed is if we impose that ￿ is symmetric and hence corresponds to
Siniscalchi￿ s (2009) vector expected utility model.
4In other cases, we get set identi￿cation; for example, when mean-dispersion preferences corre-
spond to the multiple-prior model. Recall that in the multiple-prior model, we might interpret the
C as the set of priors which the agent thinks possible. From observing the agent￿ s preferences, if
we commit to the multi-prior model, we can uniquely identify the set C. If instead we commit to
the corresponding mean-dispersion model (i.e., one with ￿ non-negative, convex and linear homo-
geneous), then we can no longer uniquely identify the single ￿ but we know it lies in the same set
C. In one model, we point identify the set. In the other, we set identify the point. Put another
way, both representations involve indeterminacy about beliefs. In one, the indeterminacy is in the
head of the agent. In the other, the indeterminacy is in the head of the econometrician.
One way to construct a mean-dispersion model is to take ￿ to be a known measure of dispersion
from statistics. Models constructed in this way are (second-order) probabilistically sophisticated.
In section 6, we state conditions on the underlying preferences that correspond to probabilistic
sophistication in a general mean-dispersion model. These conditions are analogous to those Mac-
cheroni et al (2006a) ￿nd for variational preferences. Theirs is an invariance condition on their
compensation function c. Ours is an invariance condition on our dispersion function ￿.
Finally, in section 7, we consider various notions of uncertainty or dispersion aversion. We
already examined some properties of ￿ in section 3 that corresponded to known models in the
literature on ambiguity. But if we just think of ￿ as a measure of dislike of dispersion then
other properties seem natural. If the agent at least has a preference for hedges that hold mean
utility constant then ￿ needs to be quasi-convex. If in￿ ating all dispersions by a common scalar
(holding the mean constant) makes the agent worse o⁄ then ￿ needs to be ray-monotone. We
compare these two notions with Schmeidler￿ s notion of uncertainty aversion, with Chateauneuf
and Tallon￿ s (2002) and Ghirardato and Marinacci￿ s (2002) weaker notion and with two notions
of Ergin and Gul (2009), second-order risk aversion and issue preference.
2 Set Up
We work in a standard Anscombe-Aumann setting. Let S = fs1;:::;sng be a ￿nite set of states.
Let ￿(S) be the set of probability vectors on S. Let X be the set of simple probability measures
5(or lotteries) on a set of prizes. An act is a function f : S ! X. Let F denote the set of acts.
With slight abuse of notation, let X also denote the set of constant acts; that is, x 2 X is also the
act that yields the lottery x in every state s in S. Hence, for any act f in F and any ￿xed state s0
in S, f(s0) denotes both the lottery yielded by f in state s0 and the constant act that yields the
￿xed lottery f(s0) in every state s in S. Both the sets X and F are mixture spaces. In particular,
for any pair of acts f and g in F, and any ￿ in (0;1), take ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g to be the act h 2 F in
which h(s) = ￿f (s) + (1 ￿ ￿)g (s), for each s in S.
The decision maker￿ s preferences on F are given by a binary relation %. Let ￿ denote the
strict preference and ￿ denote indi⁄erence derived from % in the usual way. For any act f 2 F,
let xf 2 X be a certainty equivalent of f if xf ￿ f. For any act f 2 F and any probability vector
￿ 2 ￿(S), let E￿ (f) 2 X be the mean act of f (with respect to ￿); that is, the constant act that,
in each state, yields the lottery
P
s ￿sf (s), the reduction of f using the weights ￿.
Given a (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility function U : X ! R on the constant acts,
let U ￿ f 2 Rn be the state-utility vector given by (U ￿ f)s = U (f (s)). Let e := (1;:::;1) 2 Rn.
We refer to the set fke : k 2 Rg as the certainty line. In particular, for each constant act x,
U ￿ x = U (x)e. For each probability vector ￿ 2 ￿(S) and each state-utility vector u 2 Rn, let
E￿ (u) := ￿ ￿ u be the expectation of u with respect to ￿. Notice that E￿ (U ￿ f) = U (E￿ (f))
and hence it can be thought of either as the mean utility of the act f (with respect to ￿) or as the
utility of the mean act of f (with respect to ￿). For each ￿ 2 R let H￿
￿ := fu 2 Rn : ￿ ￿u = ￿g be
the hyperplane in state-utility space associated with ￿ and ￿: the set of utility vectors that have
mean (with respect to ￿) equal to ￿.
De￿nition A mean-dispersion representation is given by a tuple hU;￿;￿i where U : X ! R is an
expected utility function; ￿ 2 ￿(S) is a probability vector; and ￿ : H0
￿ ! R is a continuous
function with ￿(0) = 0, and preferences over acts are given by:
V (f) = ￿(f;￿) ￿ ￿(d(f;￿)),
where ￿(f;￿) := E￿ (U ￿ f) is the mean utility of the act f with respect to ￿, and d(f;￿)
is the vector of deviations from the mean given by ds := U (f (s)) ￿ ￿(f;￿).
6Where no confusion arises, we will omit the dependence of ￿ and d on f and ￿. We refer to
￿as a dispersion function, and we call preferences mean-dispersion preferences if they have a
mean-dispersion representation.
The normalization ￿(0) = 0 means that the mean-dispersion evaluation of any constant act x
is U (x) and hence V (f) = U (xf). Thus, for all acts f, the associated dispersion ￿(d) is given by
E￿ (U ￿ f)￿U (xf), the di⁄erence between the mean utility of the act and its certainty-equivalent
utility. This motivates thinking of ￿ as an uncertainty premium.
For the mean-dispersion preferences % with representation hU;￿;￿i, let %u be the induced
preferences over state-utility vectors; that is, for all u;u0 in Rn, u %u u0 if there exists acts f,g
2 F such that U ￿ f = u, U ￿ g = u0 and f % g. Thus, each mean-dispersion representation
hU;￿;￿i is associated with a function W : U ￿ F ! R representing the corresponding preferences
over state-utility vectors given by W(u) = E￿ (u) ￿ ￿(u ￿ (E￿ (u))e). We call a mean-dispersion
representation monotone if the associated function W is weakly increasing, and dispersion averse
if ￿(d) ￿ 0 for all d in H0
￿. We call a mean-dispersion representation unbounded if U ￿ F = Rn.
3 Axioms and Main Theorems
A.1 Order. % is transitive and complete.
A.2 Continuity. For any three acts f;g and h in F, the sets f￿ 2 [0;1] : ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g % hg and
f￿ 2 [0;1] : h % ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)gg are closed.
A.3 Monotonicity. For any pair of acts f and g in F, if f (s) % g (s) for all s 2 S then f % g.
A.3￿ Substitution. For any pair of acts f and g in F, if f (s) ￿ g (s) for all s 2 S, then f ￿ g.
A.4 Unboundedness. For any pair of acts f and g in F and any ￿ 2 (0;1), there exist w and z in
X satisfying g ￿ ￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)f and ￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)g ￿ f.6
The ￿rst three axioms above are standard. It is usual to use the monotonicity axiom to deliver
state independence. However, since there are interesting examples of mean-dispersion preferences
6 This axiom comes from Kopylov (2007) and is similar to that used by Maccheroni et al (2006a).
7that are not monotone (e.g., mean-variance preferences), we also include a weaker substitution
axiom A.3￿ that is su¢ cient for state independence. Axiom A.4 is not essential to what follows
but it simpli￿es the analysis. It is standard to have a non-degeneracy axiom, but in our case,
non-degeneracy is implied by A.4.
The next axiom captures our notion of constant absolute uncertainty aversion. A standard
ordinal way to describe risk attitudes is in terms of the random variables that the agent would
prefer to a sure outcome. Constant absolute risk aversion says that if we add or subtract the
same constant both to a random variable and to a sure outcome to which it is preferred, then
the preference is maintained. For heuristic purposes let us abuse notation and write this as:
for all random variables ~ X and degenerate random variables (i.e., sure outcomes) x, y and z, if
￿ ~ X + x % z + x￿then ￿ ~ X + y % z + y￿ . The addition operation used here is not well de￿ned in
the context of Anscombe-Aumann acts, but we can de￿ne an analogous notion using mixtures.
A.5 Constant absolute uncertainty aversion. For any act f in F, any three constant acts x,y and
z, and any ￿ in (0;1),
￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)x % ￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)x ) ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)y % ￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)y.
Axiom A.5 is implied by Anscombe-Aumann￿ s independence axiom, but it is also implied
by many weakenings of independence in the literature such as Schmeidler￿ s (1989) comonotonic
independence, Gilboa and Schmeidler￿ s (1989) certainty independence, and even Maccheroni et
al￿ s (2006a) weak certainty independence. At ￿rst glance constant absolute uncertainty aversion
appears weaker than Maccheroni et al￿ s axiom: if we replace the constant act z in the statement
of axiom A.5 with a general act g then we obtain Maccheroni et al￿ s axiom. But we show in
lemma 19 of the appendix that, in the presence of axioms A1, A2, A3￿ and A.4, constant absolute
uncertainty aversion and weak certainty independence are equivalent.
Together with the ￿rst four axioms, constant absolute uncertainty aversion characterizes mean-
dispersion preferences.
Theorem 1 (Mean-Dispersion) The preferences % satisfy axioms A.1, A2, A3￿, A4 and A.5
8if and only if they admit an unbounded mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i. If axiom A.3￿ is
replaced by A.3, then (in addition) the associated function W is weakly increasing.
Moreover, the utility function U is unique up to a¢ ne transformations with appropriate ad-





represent the same preferences.
We state theorem 1 ￿rst without the monotonicity axiom, A.3, to emphasize that we can accom-
modate non-monotonic examples such as mean-variance preferences. Monotonicity plays no role
in the construction of the mean-dispersion representations per se: its only role is the obvious one,
restricting the representations to be monotone. Notice also that no convexity axiom is required.
Although the representation we obtain di⁄ers from that in Maccheroni et al (2006a), parts
of the proof build upon their arguments. In particular, axiom A.5 (like their weak certainty
independence axiom) is used twice. First, it is used to ensure that preferences over constant acts
have an a¢ ne utility representation U. Given such a U, the underlying preferences % over acts
induces preferences %u over state-utility vectors. (Axiom A.4 allows us to treat the domain of
the induced preferences as the whole of Rn.) The second use of axiom A.5 is to ensure that these
induced preferences satisfy a translation invariance property. The last step in the proof adapts
an argument of Roberts (1980) from social-choice to show that preferences with this translation
invariance admit representations with the appropriate form.
An immediate consequence of theorem 1 is that Choquet expected utility preferences, multiple-
prior preferences, variational preferences and many others can be thought of as mean-dispersion
preferences. The reason is that all of these models implicitly assume constant absolute uncertainty
aversion. Below we will provide speci￿c mean-dispersion versions of these models.
Although theorem 1 captures the whole class of mean-dispersion preferences, it is too general
to be very useful. In particular, given just these axioms, any probability vector ￿ 2 ￿(S) is
associated with a mean-dispersion representation of the preferences. Moreover, theorem 1 places no
restrictions on the dispersion functions ￿ except continuity and the fact that ￿(0) = 0. Typically,
we will be interested in mean-dispersion preferences that at least partially tie down the admissible
probabilities and that put more structure on the dispersion functions. These issues are related.
9The next result considers four properties we might want to impose on a dispersion function:
dispersion aversion (i.e., ￿ ￿ 0), convexity (i.e., ￿(￿d + (1 ￿ ￿)d0) ￿ ￿￿(d) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(d0) for
all ￿ 2 [0;1]), linear homogeneity (i.e., ￿(￿d) = ￿￿(d) for all ￿ > 0), and symmetry (i.e.,
￿(d) = ￿(￿d)). These four properties are related to the following four axioms. The ￿rst is due
to Chateauneuf and Tallon (2002).
A.6￿ Preference for complete hedges. For any ￿nite set of acts f1;:::;fm in F such that f1 ￿ fj
for all j = 2;:::;m, and any constant act x in X: if the convex combination a1f1 + ::: +
amfm = x then x % f1.
Axiom A.6￿ is a weakening of Schmeidler￿ s (1989) convexity axiom, which is often taken as the
de￿nition of uncertainty aversion:
A.6 Convexity. For any pair of acts f and g in F and ￿ in (0;1), f ￿ g ) ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g % f.
The intuition behind Schmeidler￿ s convexity axiom is that mixing indi⁄erent acts provides a hedge
against subjective uncertainty. This property is sometimes called Schmeidler uncertainty aversity.
Axiom A.6￿ only requires this mixing to be preferred if it provides a ￿ perfect hedge￿ ; that is, if all
subjective uncertainty is removed. It does not require all partial hedges to be preferred.7
Both axioms A.6 and A6￿ arose in the context of the Choquet expected utility model. The
next axiom is related to Gilboa & Schmeidler￿ s certainty independence axiom, the key axiom in
their multiple-prior model.
A.7 Certainty betweenness. For any act f in F, any constant act x and any ￿ in (0;1): f ￿ x )
￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ x.
Axiom A.7 says that if the constant act x is a ￿ certainty equivalent￿of the act f then it is also
a certainty equivalent of any combination of the act with itself. Gilboa & Schmeidler￿ s certainty
independence axiom immediately implies the conjunction of constant absolute uncertainty aversion
(axiom A.5) and certainty equivalent betweenness (axiom A.7). We will show in lemma 19 of the
7 This is analogous to Yaari￿ s notion of weak risk aversion: the expectation of a lottery is weakly preferred to
the lottery itself, but the agent is not necessarily averse to all mean-preserving spreads.
10appendix that, in the presence of axioms A1, A2, A3￿, and A.4, axioms A.5 and A.7 are equivalent
to Gilboa & Schmeidler￿ s axiom.
The last axiom is due to Siniscalchi (2009) and is the key axiom in his vector-expected utility
(VEU) model. We ￿rst need Siniscalchi￿ s de￿nition of complementary acts.
De￿nition Two acts f and ￿ f are complementary if and only if, for any two states s and s0:
1
2f (s) + 1
2
￿ f (s) ￿ 1
2f (s0) + 1
2





referred to as a complementary pair.
Given this de￿nition, Siniscalchi introduces the following axiom.




, (g; ￿ g) : if
f % ￿ f and g % ￿ g then ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g % ￿ ￿ f + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ g for all ￿ in (0;1).
The following theorem identi￿es the property of the dispersion function ￿ that corresponds to
each of these known axioms.
Theorem 2 (Taxonomy) Given axioms A1-A.5, the preferences % admit a monotone unbounded
mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i in which dispersion function ￿ is:
(a) non-negative if and only if the preferences satisfy axiom A.6￿;
(b) non-negative and convex if and only if the preferences satisfy axiom A.6;
(c) linear homogenous if and only if the preferences satisfy axiom A.7; and
(d) symmetric if and only if the preferences satisfy axiom A.8.8
Notice in part (b) that axiom A.6, by itself, only implies quasi-concavity of the representation, but
when combined with constant absolute uncertainty aversion, it is enough to force the dispersion
function to be convex.
Theorem 1 already established that many well-known classes of preferences are mean-dispersion
preferences. The following corollary connects several such classes to the corresponding restriction
on the dispersion function ￿.
8 Given theorem 1, part (4) is essentially a corollary of results in Siniscalchi (2009), but we provide a ￿low-tech￿
proof exploiting the ￿nite state space.
11Corollary 3 Suppose that axiom A.4 holds. Then:
(a) If the preferences % have a (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i,
then ￿ is non-negative if and only if % are ￿weakly ambiguity averse￿ in the sense of of
Ghirardato and Marinacci [2002]).
(b) Variational preferences (Maccheroni et al [2006a]) are the subset of (monotone, unbounded)
mean-dispersion preferences that admit a representation in which ￿ non-negative and convex.
(c) Invariant biseparable preferences (Ghirardato et al. [2004]) are the subset of (monotone,
unbounded) mean-dispersion preferences that admit a representation in which ￿ is linear
homogenous.
(d) Vector expected utility (VEU) preferences (Siniscalchi 2009) are the subset of (monotone,
unbounded) mean-dispersion preferences that admit a representation in which ￿ is symmetric.
(e) Multiple-prior (MEU) preferences (Gilboa & Schmeidler [1989]) are the subset of (monotone,
unbounded) mean-dispersion preferences that admit a representation in which ￿ is non-
negative, convex and linear homogenous.9
(f) Choquet expected utility (CEU) preferences (Schmeidler [1989]) are the subset of (monotone,
unbounded) mean-dispersion preferences that admit a representation in which ￿ is comonoton-
ically linear; i.e., for all ￿ 2 [0;1] and all comonotonic d;d0 2 H0
￿ ￿(￿d + (1 ￿ ￿)d0) =
￿￿(d) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(d0).
In the proof of theorem 2 we derive the properties of the function ￿ directly from the axioms.
A consequence of corollary 3 is that we could, instead, have started from a known representation
such as variational preferences and then ￿ solved￿for what ￿ must be in the corresponding mean-
dispersion representation. We use the direct approach in part because it is simple, and in part
to emphasize that we do not need to go via the known forms of representation to derive the
mean-dispersion forms.
9 Given theorem 1, part (e) can also be shown using results in Safra & Segal (1998), and Chambers & Quiggin
(1998).
124 Examples
Some examples may help illustrate the results from section 3. In each of the examples, let U be
an unbounded a¢ ne utility function.
Example 1 (mean-standard deviation preferences) Fix ￿ 2 ￿(S), let ￿ S := fs 2 S : ￿ (s) > 0g,
and let the mean-dispersion preferences be de￿ned by ￿(d) :=
p




standard deviation and ￿ > 0 is such that ￿ < mins2￿ S (￿s=(1 ￿ ￿s)).
We show in appendix B that these preferences are monotone. The dispersion function in example
1 is non-negative, convex, linear homogenous and symmetric. By corollary 3 parts (c), (d) and
(e), these preferences are an example of VEU preferences that are Schmeidler uncertainty averse,
and hence they must also have a multiple-prior (and hence invariant biseparable) representation:
see Grant & Kajii (2007) for the corresponding set of priors.
Example 2 (value at risk preferences) Fix ￿ 2 ￿(S) and an ￿ 2 (0;1), and let the mean-
dispersion preferences be de￿ned by ￿(d) := V aR￿ (d) = ￿inf ft 2 R : ￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) ￿ tg) > ￿g.
Value at risk is a standard measure of risk in ￿nance: see, for example, F￿llmer and Schied (2004).
Notice that ￿(d) is the negative of the (upper) ￿-quantile of the random variable d under ￿, hence
the preferences given by the negative of value at risk are (weakly) monotone. This dispersion
function is linear homogeneous but not in general non-negative, convex or symmetric. Thus,
by corollary 3, these preferences are invariant biseperable but not in general variational, VEU,
Schmeidler uncertainty averse or even Gharardato-Marinacci ambiguity averse. In fact, value
at risk preferences are comonotonically linear: we show in appendix B that they have a CEU
representation given by the capacity ￿V aR￿ (E) = 0 if ￿ (E) ￿ ￿ and ￿V aR￿ (E) = 1 if ￿ (E) > ￿.
Example 3 (conditional value at risk￿ preferences) Fix ￿ 2 ￿(S) and an ￿ 2 (0;1), and
let the mean-dispersion preferences be de￿ned by ￿(d) := CV aR￿ (d) = 1
￿
R ￿
0 V aR￿ (d)d￿
Conditional value at risk was introduced more recently as a measure of risk in ￿nance: see
again, F￿llmer and Schied (2004). This ￿ deviation￿form of CVaR is due to Rockafellar et al
13(2006). For intuition on the name of this dispersion function, notice that if S were in￿nite
and the distribution function induced by ￿ and d was continuous at V aR￿ then we could write
￿(d) := ￿E [djd ￿ ￿V aR￿ (d)]. P￿ ug (2000) shows that conditional value at risk is a ￿coherent
risk measure￿ in the sense of Artzner et al (1999). It follows that the preferences above are
monotone, and that the dispersion function is non-negative, linear homogeneous and convex.
Thus, by corollary 3, these preferences have a multiple-prior representation. A slight adaptation
of Follmer and Schied￿ s (2004) theorem 4.47 shows that the corresponding multiple-prior set is
given by CCV aR￿ = fp 2 ￿(S) : p(s)=￿ (s) ￿ 1=￿g. Conditional value at risk preferences
also inherit the comonotonic linearity of value at risk preferences and hence also admit a CEU





Still within the ￿nance literature, Rockafellar et al. (2006) extend the properties of standard
deviation and conditional value at risk to de￿ne what they call ￿generalized deviations￿ . These
correspond to ￿ that are non-negative, convex and linear homogenous, but the associated mean-
dispersion preferences are not in general monotonic. Other examples come from beyond ￿nance.





denote a reordering of the elements of the vector d, in which d[j] ￿ d[j+1], for all














, where ￿[0] := 0 and ￿ ￿ 0.
The name derives from Donaldson and Weymark￿ s (1980) analogous measures of income
inequality: if we view the state-contingent utility vector u as a vector of incomes across so-
ciety, interpreting the probability ￿s as the fraction of the population receiving income us,
we can view W (u) = ￿ ￿ ￿(d) as the ￿equally distributed equivalent income (EDEI)￿ . For






s=1 ￿s￿s0 jds ￿ ds0j. For ￿ = 1, W (u) = mins fusg, and for ￿ = 0 W (u) = maxs fusg.
This dispersion function is comonotonically linear (hence linear homogenous). Thus, by corollary
3, part (f), the corresponding mean-dispersion preferences are CEU. The dispersion function is
positive and convex for ￿ > 1, and negative and concave for ￿ < 1. In appendix B, we show it is
symmetric if and only if ￿ = 1 or ￿ = 2.
14Example 5 (mean-log(mean absolute error) preferences) Fix ￿ 2 ￿(S), and let the mean-
dispersion preferences be de￿ned by ￿(d) := k(log(1 +
P
s ￿s jdsj)) where k < 1=4.
These preferences come from Ergin & Gul (2009) who show that they are monotone. This dis-
persion function is non-negative and symmetric but not convex or linear homogenous. Thus, the
preferences are neither invariant biseparable nor variational, but they are an example of VEU pref-
erences which are Ghirardato-Marinacci ambiguity averse but not Schmeidler ambiguity averse.
Example 6 (multiplier preferences) Fix ￿ 2 ￿(S), and let the mean-dispersion preferences
be de￿ned by ￿(d) := ￿ln[
P
s ￿s exp(￿ds=￿)] for ￿ > 0.
These preferences were introduced by Hansen & Sargent (2001) and were axiomatized by Strza-
lecki (2011). Their representation takes the variational form V (f) = minp2￿(S)
P
s psU (f (s)) +
￿R(pj￿) where ￿ > 0 and R(pj￿) is the relative entropy of the probability p with respect to ￿;
that is, R(pj￿) =
P
s ps log(ps=￿s) if p ￿ ￿, and 1 otherwise. Maccheroni et al (2006b) provide
a primal representation for these preferences.10 In appendix B, we show that the Maccheroni et
al￿ s primal representation can be re-written in the form above. The dispersion function in example
6 is non-negative and convex but not linear homogenous, and it is not symmetric unless S has
just two elements and ￿ is uniform, Hence these preferences are neither invariant biseparable nor
VEU.
Example 7 (Hurwicz preferences) Let ￿ be uniform. Fix a 2 [0;1] and let ￿ be the capacity
de￿ned by: ￿(;) = 0, ￿(S) = 1, and ￿ (E) = ￿ for all E ￿ S, E 6= f;;Sg. Let the mean dispersion
preferences be de￿ned by ￿(d) = ￿
R
(d)d￿, the Choquet integral with respect to the capacity ￿.
These preferences were introduced by Hurwicz (1951). Their standard representation takes the
form: V (f) = ￿maxs2S U (f (s)) + (1 ￿ ￿)mins2S U (f (s)). In appendix B, we show that the
preferences also have the above mean-dispersion representation, and hence are CEU. The disper-
sion function in example 7 is linear homogenous hence the preferences are invariant biseparable.
It is not symmetric unless ￿ = 1=2 (hence the preferences are not VEU), and it is not convex
10 See also Dupuis & Ellis (1997, Prop 1.4.2, pp.33-4). We thank Massimo Marinacci for sending helpful notes
on this paper.
15unless ￿ = 0. The dispersion function is non-negative (and hence the preferences are Gharardato-
Marinacci ambiguity averse) if and only if ￿ ￿ 1=n.
5 Identifying beliefs.
In this section, we consider what restrictions are placed on the probability ￿ in a mean-dispersion
representation. Equivalently, if an econometrician knew (or made the structural assumption) that
an agent had mean-dispersion preferences, to what extent could she identify ￿ from observing
those preferences.
To ￿x ideas, consider multiple-prior preferences. A literal interpretation of the standard MEU
representation treats the multiple-prior set as those probabilities that the agent considers possible,
and assumes the agent evaluates each act using the minimizer from this set.11 If an econometrician
commits to this model, he can identify exactly the agent￿ s set of beliefs from observing her prefer-
ences. From corollary 3, we know that any multiple-prior preferences also have a mean-dispersion
representation. A literal interpretation of this representation treats the agent as having only one
prior, ￿, and assumes that the agent simply dislikes dispersion of utilities across states with this
dislike represented by ￿. If an econometrician commits to this model, he cannot identify the
agent￿ s single belief from observing her preferences, but (see corollary 5(b) below) the econometri-
cian knows this belief lies in exactly the same set as appeared in the multiple-prior representation.
Both representations involve indeterminacy about beliefs. In one, the indeterminacy is in the head
of the agent. In the other, the same indeterminacy is in the head of the econometrician.
In general, our ability to identify ￿ will depend on restrictions we place on the mean-dispersion
model, in particular on the dispersion function ￿. In the most general version of the model in
theorem 1, we only restricted ￿ to be normalized and continuous. This yielded no restriction on
￿: that is, any ￿ is admissible in the sense that there exists a mean-dispersion representation
of the underlying preferences involving this ￿. But if we also restrict ￿ to be non-negative (i.e.,
the preferences are dispersion averse), then the set of admissible ￿ corresponds to Ghirardato
11 See, for example, Gilboa et al, (2010). Of course, the model does not require us to have this literal interpre-
tation.
16& Marinacci (2002)￿ s and Ghirardato et al (2004)￿ s notion of the core.12 Recall that E￿ (f) is
the constant act that, in each state, yields the lottery
P
s ￿sf (s), and that xf is the certainty
equivalent of f.
De￿nition A probability vector ￿ is an element of core(%) ￿ ￿(S) if: for all acts f and g, xf %
E￿ (g) implies f % g.
Proposition 4 (identifying ￿) If preferences % satisfy axioms A.1-A.5 then: a probability vec-
tor ￿ 2 ￿(S) is in core(%) if and only if there exists an (unbounded a¢ ne) utility function U
and a non-negative dispersion function ￿ such that hU;￿;￿i is a (monotone, unbounded) mean-
dispersion representation of the preferences. The set core(%) is closed and convex.
Given theorem 2, the following are immediate corollaries.13
Corollary 5 Consider the (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion preferences %.
(a) core(%) is non-empty if and only if % satisfy A:6￿ (i.e., there exists a mean-dispersion
representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ ￿ 0).
(b) If the preferences admit a MEU representation minp2PEp (U ￿ f) for some convex set P ￿
￿(S), then a probability vector ￿ admits a (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion repre-
sentation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ non-negative, convex and linear homogenous if and only if ￿ 2 P.
(c) If the preferences admit a CEU representation with capacity ￿, then a probability vector
￿ admits a (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ non-
negative and comonotonically linear if an only if ￿ 2 core(￿).
Geometrically, we can think of the core(%) as the normal vectors of the supporting hyperplanes
of the upper contour sets at the certainty line. Thus ￿ will be unique if there is a unique supporting
hyperplane for the upper contour set fu : u %u ￿eg. A su¢ cient condition for this is for preferences
12 Ghirardato & Marinacci￿ s (2002, p.268) set D(%) and GMM￿ s (2004, p.151) notion of the core were de￿ned
in the context of the bi-separable model, but the de￿nition here is, we hope, a natural extension to general mean-
dispersion preferences.
13 Parts (b) and (c) also follow from Ghirardato & Marinacci (2002: corollaries 13 and 14).
17at certainty to be locally approximated by SEU preferences. To express this in terms of underlying
preferences, notice that for SEU preferences there is a probability vector ￿ such that implication of
the core condition goes both ways: that is, not only xf % E￿(g) implies g % f but also E￿(g) ￿ xf
implies g ￿ f. This suggests the following partial or local converse to the core condition.
A.9 (local smoothness) For all ￿ 2 core(%) and all acts f and g: if E￿(g) ￿ xf then there
exists an ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] such that for all ￿ 2 (0; ￿ ￿): ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)xf ￿ xf.14
If preferences satisfy this local smoothness condition then ￿ is unique; moreover, this condition
is necessary in the case where preferences are convex.
Proposition 6 (uniqueness I) Suppose that preferences % admit a (monotone, unbounded) mean-
dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ ￿ 0 (i.e., they satisfy axioms A.1-A.5, and A.6￿). Then
the following are equivalent.
(a) the preferences satisfy A.9
(b) ￿ is Gateaux di⁄erentiable with ￿0 (0;d) = 0 for all d; that is, the corresponding W has
rW (0) = ￿.
In this case, core(%) = f￿g; i.e., ￿ is unique. If A.6￿ is replaced by A.6 then uniqueness is
equivalent to conditions (a) and (b) above.
Two remarks: ￿rst, absent the convexity axiom A.6, axiom A.9 is su¢ cient but not necessary
for ￿ to be unique. Consider the case with two states and induced preferences %u, where the
hyperplane H0
￿ supports the upper contour set fu : u %u 0eg in three points; once at 0e and once
on either side, say at d and ￿d 2 H0
￿. At 0e, the preferences could be ￿ kinked￿ , but the two
other points, d and ￿d prevent there existing any other supporting hyperplane at 0e. Second,
the di⁄erentiability at the certainty line in proposition 6 is ￿ very local￿ . In particular, on its own,
axiom A.9 does not imply that ￿ is continuously or even strictly di⁄erentiable at 0.
We next consider two variants of the local smoothness condition, A.9. The ￿rst variant provides
us with a uniqueness condition for ￿ even when ￿ is not restricted to be non-negative (i.e., the
core might be empty), but at the cost of imposing an existential condition on ￿.
14 A weaker su¢ cient condition for uniqueness is: for all ￿ 2 ￿(s) such that the core condition holds, and for
any pair of acts f and g: E￿ (g) ￿ xf implies there exists an ￿ 2 (0;1] such that ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)xf ￿ xf.
18A.9* (local smoothness*) There exists ￿ 2 ￿(S) such that for any pair of acts f and g:
E￿ (g) ￿ xf (resp. xf ￿ E￿ (g)) implies there exists an ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] such that for all ￿ 2 (0; ￿ ￿),
￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)xf ￿ xf (resp. xf ￿ ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)xf).
Axiom A.9 yields a unique ￿ for ￿ non-negative; that is, when preferences are dispersion averse.
Axiom A.9* yields a uniqueness result for (locally) di⁄erentiable ￿ even when dispersion aversion
may fail.15
Proposition 7 (uniqueness II) Preferences % satisfy axioms A.1-A.5, and A.9￿ if and only
if there exits a (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ Gateaux
di⁄erentiable at 0 with ￿0 (0;d) = 0 for all d; that is, the corresponding W has rW (0) = ￿. In
this case, ￿ is unique.
An alternate route to get unique identi￿cation of ￿ without assuming either dispersion aversion
or di⁄erentiability is to impose symmetry on ￿. In this case, by part (d) of corollary 3, the mean-
dispersion preferences correspond to vector-expected utility, and Siniscalchi (2009) shows that the
baseline prior ￿ is unique in this case.
To motivate the second variant of axiom A.9, recall that in the case of SEU preferences, we
identify beliefs with the marginal rates of substitution (or shadow prices) across states at certainty.
Ghirardato et al (2004) generalize this idea in the context of invariant biseparable preferences,
and argue for using the set of marginal rates of substitution across states at certainty to identify
the set of beliefs of the agent. If we extend this idea to general mean-dispersion preferences, the
set of marginal rates of substitution is larger than the core.16 But the following weakening of
axiom A.9 gives a case where the two sets coincide.17 Intuitively, whereas axiom A.9 ensures that
preferences around certainty are locally approximated by SEU preferences, axiom A.9￿￿ ensures
that preferences around certainty are locally approximated by MEU preferences.
15 In the case of dispersion-averse preferences ￿that is, givenA.1-A.5 and A.6￿ ￿A.9 implies A.9￿.
16 Indeed, this is already true for the invariant biseparable case.
17 Ghirardato et al (2004) use the Clark superdi⁄erential for their set of marginal rates of substitution whereas we
will use Dini superdi⁄erential. In general, the Clark superdi⁄erential is larger than the Dini superdi⁄erential (which
may be empty). Given axioms A.6￿ and A.9￿, however, the Dini superdi⁄erential is su¢ cient for our purposes. In
particular, the non-empty core(%) corresponds to the Dini superdi⁄erential, and the (Dini) directional derivatives
are the support functions of the Dini superdi⁄erential (see, Borwein and Lewis p.36 and pp. 125-6).
19A.9** (local MEU) For all acts f and g: if E￿(g) ￿ xf for all ￿ 2 core(%) then there exists
an ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] such that for all ￿ 2 (0; ￿ ￿): ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)xf ￿ xf.
This is weaker than axiom A.9 since the condition E￿(g) ￿ xf must now hold for all ￿ in the core.
Proposition 8 (local MEU) Suppose that preferences % admit a (monotone, unbounded) mean-
dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ ￿ 0 (i.e., they satisfy axioms A.1-A.5, and A.6￿), and
let W be the associated representation over the induced preferences %u. Then the following are
equivalent.
(a) the preferences satisfy A.9￿￿
(b) the Dini directional derivative of W at 0 with respect to ^ u exists and is given by W0 (0; ^ u) =
^ ￿ ￿ ^ u where ^ ￿ minimizes ^ ￿ ￿ ^ u on core(%).
In this case, core(%) is equal to the Dini superdi⁄erential of W at 0.
6 Probabilistic Sophistication
In this section, we consider conditions such that mean-dispersion preferences are second-order
probabilistically sophisticated. It is natural when discussing probabilistic sophistication to consider
in￿nite states. Thus, for this section, we will allow the state space S to be in￿nite. Let ￿ be
a sigma algebra of S, and let F now be the set of simple (i.e., ￿nite valued) ￿-measurable acts;
that is, for any f in F, f￿1 (x) 2 ￿, for all x 2 X and the set fx 2 X : 9s 2 S, s.t f (s) = xg is
￿nite. We will abuse notation throughout the section. Formally, however, let B0 (￿) denote the
set of real-valued, ￿-measurable, simple functions. Thus, ￿xing an act f, for any utility function
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Given a probability measure ￿ on the events in ￿, each Anscombe-Aumann act f is mapped to




to each second-stage lottery
20x in X. Preferences are second-order probabilistically sophisticated if they can be described by
the ordering they induce on these two-stage lotteries. Formally:
De￿nition 1 (Second-Order Probabilistic Sophistication) We say that the preferences %









all x 2 X implies f ￿ g:
The following theorem gives conditions for mean-dispersion preferences hU;￿;￿i to be second-
order probabilistically sophisticated with respect to ￿.
Proposition 9 (Probabilistic Sophistication I) Let % be mean-dispersion preferences. Then
the following are equivalent:
(a) The preferences are second-order probabilistically sophisticated with respect to ￿.
(b) The preferences admit a mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i where ￿ has the property
that for any pair of utility di⁄erences from the mean d and d0
￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) ￿ tg) = ￿ (fs 2 S : d0 (s) ￿ tg) for all t 2 R ) ￿(d) = ￿(d0) (1)
The restriction on ￿ in expression (1) is analogous to the restriction in Maccheroni et al￿ s
theorem 14 that their ￿ cost function￿c is re-arrangement invariant. In words, condition (1) says
that if two di⁄erences-from-the-mean-functions d and d0 induce the same probability distribution
over di⁄erences with respect to ￿ then their dispersions ￿(d) and ￿(d0) are the same.
A more subtle issue is whether mean-dispersion preferences being second-order probabilistically
sophisticated with respect to some ￿ implies that they have a mean-dispersion representation that
involves that same ￿ and has the properties on the associated ￿ implied by theorem 2. It turns
out that this is indeed the case, at least if ￿ is convex-valued (or uniform in the case that S is
￿nite).18
18 A probability measure ￿ is convex-valued if for every event E 2 ￿, and every r 2 (0;1), there exists an event
D ￿ E such that ￿ (D) = r￿ (E).
21Proposition 10 (Probabilistic Sophistication II) Suppose % admits a mean-dispersion rep-
resentation hU;￿;￿i and is second-order probabilistically sophisticated with respect to ￿. If ￿ is
convex valued (or uniform if S is ￿nite) then the claims of theorem 2 hold for this representation.
7 Aversion to dispersion.
This section considers di⁄erent notions of uncertainty aversion or aversion to variation of utility
across states: the standard notion introduced by Schmeidler (1989), the two notions introduced by
Ergin and Gul (2009), two new notions suggested by the mean-dispersion model, and the notion
of Chateauneuf and Talon (2002). In the mean-dispersion model, an agent￿ s attitude toward
uncertainty or the dispersion of utilities across states is captured by properties of the function
￿(:), which can be thought of as the utility premium for removing such dispersion. We already
know from section 3 that aversion to dispersion (i.e., ￿ ￿ 0) is equivalent to Chateauneuf and
Talon￿ s preference for complete hedges, axiom A.6￿ (which in turn is equivalent to Ghirardato
and Marinacci￿ s (2002) weak ambiguity aversion) which is weaker than Schmeidler￿ s uncertainty
aversion, axiom A.6.
Schmeidler￿ s notion of uncertainty aversion says that the agent always (weakly) prefers to
hedge. From the perspective of mean-dispersion preferences, however, hedging a⁄ects both dis-
persions and means. The trade o⁄between mean and dispersion is captured by a cardinal property
of ￿, namely convexity. We might want to assume that hedging reduces dispersion premiums with-
out committing to a particular trade o⁄ between means and dispersion. That is, we might want
to assume that ￿ is quasi-convex but not necessarily convex. Most classical measures of dispersion
are indeed quasi-convex.
An agent with mean-dispersion preferences for whom ￿ is quasi-convex exhibits uncertainty
aversion subject to holding the mean utility ￿xed. That is, for mean dispersion preferences
hU;￿;￿i, ￿ is quasi-convex if and only if the following property holds for that ￿. Recall that
E￿ (f) is the mean act (or reduction) of f with respect to ￿.
De￿nition 2 (Common-Mean Uncertainty Aversion) For any pair of acts f;g in F such
that E￿ (f) = E￿ (g) and any ￿ in (0;1), if f ￿ g then ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g % f.
22An example of mean-dispersion preferences in which ￿ is quasi-convex but not convex was given
by example 5 in section 3 where, recall, the dispersion is de￿ned to be ￿(d) := k(log(1 +
P
s ￿s jdsj))
where k < 1=4.19 The reason an agent with these preferences is common mean uncertainty averse
but not uncertainty averse in Schmeidler￿ s sense is that, loosely speaking, she has ￿ decreasing mar-
ginal disutility of dispersion￿re￿ ected in the log. Convexity, by ruling out this kind of example, is
saying more than that the agent is averse to dispersion across states: it is saying that the agent
has ￿ (weakly) increasing marginal disutility of dispersion￿as we increase the dispersion.
Even though quasi-convexity seems a natural property to put on an index of dispersion aversion,
there are well-known preferences introduced in the context of ambiguity that turn out to have a
mean-dispersion representation in which ￿ is non-negative and yet not quasi-convex. For example,
the ￿ of the Hurwicz preferences of example 7 (with ￿ < 1=n) is not quasi-convex. Similarly, in
￿nance, the ￿ of the value-at-risk preferences of example 2 are not quasi-convex. But, to the best
of our knowledge, all examples in the literature that admit a mean-dispersion representation with
￿ ￿ 0 satisfy at least ray monotonicity: ￿(kd) ￿ ￿(d) for all d 2 H0
￿ and all k > 1.20 This
property just says that as we increase statewise di⁄erences from the mean by scalar multiplication,
holding the mean ￿xed, then the agent is weakly worse o⁄. All classical measures of dispersion
satisfy this property.
An agent with mean-dispersion preferences for whom ￿ is ray monotonic prefers to move
towards a constant act (holding mean utility ￿xed). That is, for mean dispersion preferences
hU;￿;￿i, ￿ is ray monotonic if and only if the following property holds for that ￿.
De￿nition 3 (Common-Mean Monotonicity) For any pair of act f in F, and any ￿ in (0;1),
￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ (f) % f.
Clearly, common-mean uncertainty aversion implies common mean monotonicity. Less clear is
how these connect with conditions considered by Ergin and Gul in the context of preferences that
are also second-order probabilistically sophisticated.
19 This ￿ is quasi-convex since it is a monotonic transformation of a convex function. Ergin & Gul (2009) show
that these preferences are not convex.
20 This says that the upper contour sets of ￿ on H0
￿ are star-shaped with respect to the origin.
23Following Ergin and Gul, let ￿f be the two-stage lottery generated by ￿ and f; that is, the





and Gul show that if ￿ is convex-valued, then an agent who is second-order probabilistically
sophisticated with respect to ￿ is averse to mean-preserving spreads in the (￿rst stage of the)
induced two-stage lotteries if and only if the following property holds.
De￿nition 4 (Second-Order Risk Aversion) For any pair of acts f;g in F and any ￿ in
(0;1), if ￿f = ￿g then ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g % f.
Ergin and Gul also introduced a weaker condition for preferences that are second-order prob-
abilistically sophisticated with respect to ￿. We say that an act is degenerate in the second stage
if, for each state s, the lottery f (s) is degenerate. Ergin and Gul￿ s second condition captures the
idea that an agent would prefer to bet on the (objective) events that de￿ne the lotteries in X than
on the (subjective) events in S.
De￿nition 5 (Issue Preference) For any acts f;g in F, if g is degenerate in the second stage,
and E￿ (f) = E￿ (g) then E￿ (f) % f % g.
The following theorem states that the two notions of aversion to dispersion around a common
mean that seem natural in the context of mean-dispersion preferences bound the two notions of
aversion to dispersion in ￿rst-stage lotteries that seem natural in the context of second-order prob-
abilistic sophistication. Furthermore, all four of these notions are in turn bounded by Schmeidler￿ s
uncertainty aversion and Chateauneuf and Tallon￿ s preference for complete hedges.
Theorem 11 (Dispersion Aversions) Suppose that the (monotone) mean-dispersion prefer-
ences % de￿ned by hU;￿;￿i are second-order probabilistically sophisticated with respect to ￿, sup-
pose that ￿ is convex valued, and suppose that the ￿nal outcome set is rich in that for all lotteries
x 2 X there exists a degenerate lottery that is indi⁄erent to x. Then uncertainty aversion (A.6)
implies common-mean uncertainty aversion which implies second-order risk aversion which implies
issue preference which implies common-mean monotonicity which implies preference for complete
hedges (A.6￿).
24A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of su¢ ciency of the axioms in theorem 1: mean-dispersion. The proof has four
steps. First, we show that, for every act f, there exists a constant act xf such that xf ￿ f.
Second, we show that there is an expected utility representation U for the preferences restricted
to constant acts. Thus we can set V (f) := U (xf). Third, we de￿ne induced preferences over the
state-utility vectors generated by U and F, and show that constant absolute uncertainty aversion
implies that these induced preferences satisfy a translation-invariance property. Finally, we show
that translation invariance allows us, for each ￿, to express V in a mean-dispersion form.
We ￿rst show that certainty equivalents exist for each act: in fact, we show a little more.
Lemma 12 (Certainty Equivalents) For all acts f in F, all constant acts x and all ￿ 2 [0;1],
there exists a constant act z such that ￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)x.
Proof. The case ￿ = 0 is trivial. For ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿rst set ^ f := ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)x and set ^ g := x.
By unboundedness A.4, there exists a ^ z such that ￿^ z + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ g ￿ ^ f. That is, ￿^ z + (1 ￿ ￿)x ￿
￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)x. Now, reset ^ f := x and reset ^ g := ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)x. By unboundedness, there exists
a ^ w such that ^ g ￿ ￿ ^ w + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ f. That is, ￿^ z + (1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿ ^ w + (1 ￿ ￿)x.
Taking ￿ ! 1 and using continuity we get ^ z ￿ f ￿ ^ w. Applying continuity again, for all ￿ 2 (0;1],
there exists some ￿ 2 [0;1], such that z := ￿ ^ w+(1 ￿ ￿) ^ z satis￿es ￿z+(1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)x,
as required. ￿
We next ￿nd an a¢ ne utility representation for the preferences restricted to constant acts.
Lemma 13 (Expected Utility on Constant Acts) The restriction of preferences to constant
acts admits an expected utility representation. That is, there exists an a¢ ne utility function
U : X ! R such that, for all x;y in X, U (x) ￿ U (y) if and only if x % y.
Proof. The proof is similar to Maccheroni et al (2006a, pp.1477-8) Consider any pair of constant









2z. By constant absolute uncertainty
25aversion A.5, we can replace z with x to obtain x ￿ 1
2y+ 1
2x and we can replace z with y to obtain
1
2x + 1
2y ￿ y, a contradiction. Then the hypotheses of Hernstein and Milnor￿ s (1953) mixture
space theorem are satis￿ed. ￿
Next, we de￿ne induced preferences on state-utility vectors. Recall that a given expected
utility function U maps the act f to a state-utility vector U ￿ f. The following lemma due to
Kopylov (2007), ensures that the range of this mapping is all of Rn.
Lemma 14 (Unboundedness [Kopylov]) Assume there exists an expected utility representa-
tion U on the constant acts. If the preferences satisfy unboundedness A.4 then U (X) = (￿1;+1).
With this in place, we can de￿ne preferences over all state-utility vectors in Rn as follows.
De￿nition (induced preferences) Fix an expected utility function U on the constant acts. Let
%u be the binary relation on Rn de￿ned by u0 %u u00 if there exists a corresponding pair of
acts f0 and f00 in F with U ￿ f0 = u0 and U ￿ f00 = u00, such that f0 % f00.
The next lemma shows that the induced preference relation is well behaved.
Lemma 15 (State-Utility Preferences) Let U be an unbounded a¢ ne representation of % on
X. The induced binary relation %u inherits order and continuity. In particular, u0 %u u00 if and
only if for all acts f0 and f00 in F such that U ￿ f0 = u0 and U ￿ f00 = u00, we have f0 % f00.
Proof. Completeness follows from unboundedness via lemma 14. That is, for any u0 in Rn, there
exists an act f in F with U ￿ f = u0. For any pair of acts f and g in F, if U ￿ f = U ￿ g then
f(s) ￿ g(s) for all s. Hence, by state independence, f ￿ g. Hence U ￿ f %u U ￿ g if and only if
f % g. Similarly, U ￿f ￿ U ￿g if and only if f ￿ g and U ￿f ￿u U ￿g if and only if f ￿ g. Hence
transitivity is inherited by %u. To establish continuity, ￿x a u in Rn and consider a sequence of
state-utility vectors (ut) converging to u. We will construct a corresponding sequence of acts, (ft)
with the property U ￿ ft = ut for all elements of ut within an "-neighborhood N (u) of u such
that ft converge to an act f where U ￿ f = u. Fix an "-neighborhood N (u) of u. Since the state
space is ￿nite, we can ￿nd a ￿ u and u such that ￿ u ￿ u0
s ￿ u for all u0 in N (u) and all s in S. By
26A.4, there exist constant acts ￿ x and x such that U (￿ x) = ￿ u, and U (x) = u. Then, for each state
utility vector ut in N (u), by expected utility on constant acts, there is a unique act ft of the form










s 2 [0;1] and ut = U ￿ft. Thus (ft) converges to an f such that
U ￿f = u. Thus, since the preferences % over acts are continuous and satisfy state-independence,
the induced preferences are continuous. ￿
The next lemma shows that constant absolute uncertainty aversion applies analogously to
indi⁄erent acts.
Lemma 16 (CAUA for indi⁄erence) If ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿z+(1 ￿ ￿)x then ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)y ￿
￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)y.
Proof. By constant absolute uncertainty aversion, we know that ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)y % ￿z+(1 ￿ ￿)y.
By expected utility on constant acts (lemma 13) and unboundedness A.4, there exists an act ^ z ￿ z
and for all ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿f+(1 ￿ ￿)x ￿ ￿(￿^ z + (1 ￿ ￿)z)+(1 ￿ ￿)x. Then by the contrapositive of
constant absolute uncertainty aversion, we obtain ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)y ￿ ￿(￿^ z + (1 ￿ ￿)z)+(1 ￿ ￿)y.
Taking ￿ ! 0 and applying continuity A.2, we obtain ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)y - ￿z+(1 ￿ ￿)y, as required.
￿
We now show that the induced preferences %u satisfy a translation invariance property.
De￿nition (translation invariance) For any pair of utility vectors u and u0 in Rn, and any
￿ 2 R, u ￿u u0 ) u + ￿e ￿u u0 + ￿e.
For the induced preferences %u, translation invariance is implied by constant absolute uncertainty
aversion.
Lemma 17 (Translation Invariance) Let U be an unbounded a¢ ne representation of % on X,
and let %u be the induced preferences over state-utility vectors in Rn. Then %u satisfy translation
invariance.21
21 This result is essentially the same as part of MMR￿ s lemma 28 except that they use their weak certainty
independence in place of constant absolute uncertainty aversion. MMR refer to translation invariance as vertical
invariance.
27Proof . Fix a state-utility vector u. By lemma 12, there exists a ￿ 2 R such that u ￿u ￿e.
Recall that constant acts are mapped to constant state-utility vectors. By unboundedness and
lemma 13, there are constant acts that correspond to each point in this line. In particular, there
is a constant act x0 in X, such that U ￿ x0 = 0e. Fix ￿ 2 (0;1) and let f be given by ￿U ￿ f +
(1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ x0 = u. The existence of f is guaranteed by unboundedness. By lemma 12, there
exists a constant act z such that ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)x0 ￿ ￿z+(1 ￿ ￿)x0. By construction U (z) = ￿=￿.
Let y be the constant act, U ￿ y = ￿e=(1 ￿ ￿). Again, the existence of such a constant act is
guaranteed by unboundedness. By constant absolute uncertainty aversion and lemma 16, we have
￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)y ￿ ￿z + (1 ￿ ￿)y. Hence, ￿U ￿ f + (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ y ￿u ￿U ￿ z + (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ y. But
￿U ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)U ￿y=u+￿e and ￿U ￿z +(1 ￿ ￿)U ￿y=￿e+￿e. By transitivity, any u0 ￿u u is
also indi⁄erent to ￿e. Hence, by a similar construction, u0+￿e ￿u ￿e+￿e. The conclusion follows
by transitivity. ￿
Although the induced preferences are not necessarily monotonic, they are increasing in the
direction parallel to the certainty line.
Lemma 18 (Certainty Monotonicity) Let U be an unbounded a¢ ne representation of of % on
X, and let %u be the induced preferences over state-utility vectors in Rn. Then, for all state-utility
vectors u in Rn and all ￿ > 0, u + ￿e ￿u u.
Proof. If u is a constant act, then the conclusion follows from the construction of %u. Fix a
state-utility vector u. By lemma 12, there exists a ￿ 2 R such that u ￿u ￿e. By translation
invariance, u + ￿e ￿u ￿e + ￿e. But the constant act ￿e + ￿e ￿u ￿e. The conclusion follows by
transitivity. ￿
Completing the proof that the axioms are su¢ cient. We adapt a standard argument (see,
for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [1995, p..834]). Applying lemmas 13 and 14, ￿x
an unbounded a¢ ne utility function U that represents the preferences on constant acts. Let %u
be the associated induced preferences on state-utility vectors. Applying lemma 12, set V (f) :=
U (xf). For all u in Rn, de￿ne W (u) 2 R by u ￿u W (u)e. That is, by construction, V (f) =
W (U ￿ f) = U (xf), and W is continuous.
28It is enough to show that for any ￿ 2 ￿(S) there exists a continuous function ￿ : H0
￿ ! R
such that W (u) = ￿ ￿ u ￿ ￿(u ￿ (￿ ￿ u)e). That is, we need to show that W (u) ￿ ￿ ￿ u depends
only on the vector of di⁄erences u￿(￿ ￿ u)e. Or equivalently, if u￿(￿ ￿ u)e = u0 ￿(￿ ￿ u0)e then
W (u)￿￿ ￿u = W (u0)￿￿ ￿u0. But if u￿(￿ ￿ u)e = u0 ￿(￿ ￿ u0)e then, by translation invariance
(lemma 17),
u0 = u + (￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ ￿ u)e ￿u W (u)e + (￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ ￿ u)e = [W (u) + (￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ ￿ u)]e
and therefore, W (u0) = W (u)+(￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿ ￿ u), as required. This completes the proof of su¢ ciency
￿
Proof of necessity of the axioms in theorem 1. For an unbounded mean-dispersion repre-
sentation hU;￿;￿i, it is immediate that the associated preferences over acts satisfy axioms A.1,
A.2 and A.3￿.
To show unboundedness, A.4, ￿x two acts f and g. Without loss of generality, assume V (f) ￿
V (g). Fix an ￿ 2 (0;1). Using the fact that U is unbounded, let v 2 R such that V (g) > ￿v +
(1 ￿ ￿)V (f). Let w 2 X be a constant act such that U (w) = v. By the representation, since w
is a constant act, V (￿w + (1 ￿ ￿)f) = ￿v+(1 ￿ ￿)V (f). The construction of z is similar. Since
￿ was arbitrary, we are done.
The next lemma shows that linear mean-dispersion preferences satisfy Maccheroni et al￿ s weak
certainty independence axiom.
Lemma 19 (weak certainty independence) Fix a mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i.
The associated preferences over acts % satisfy: for any two acts f and g in F, any two constant
acts x and y, and any ￿ in (0;1), ￿f+(1 ￿ ￿)x % ￿g+(1 ￿ ￿)x ) ￿f (1 ￿ ￿)y % ￿g+(1 ￿ ￿)y.
Proof of lemma 19. Given hU;￿;￿i, it is immediate that the induced preferences %u over state-
utility vectors satisfy translation invariance: in fact, for any pair of utility vectors u and u0 in Rn,
and any ￿ 2 R, u %u u0 ) u + ￿e %u u0 + ￿e. Fix acts f and g in F, constant acts x and y in X
29and ￿ in (0;1). Set ￿ := (1 ￿ ￿)(U ￿ y (s) ￿ U ￿ x(s)) and notice that
[￿U ￿ f + (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ y] ￿ [￿U ￿ f + (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ x]
= [￿U ￿ g + (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ y] ￿ [￿U ￿ g + (1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ x]
= ￿e.
Hence ￿U ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)U ￿x %u ￿U ￿g +(1 ￿ ￿)U ￿x implies ￿U ￿f +(1 ￿ ￿)U ￿y %u ￿U ￿g +
(1 ￿ ￿)U ￿ y. Therefore ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)x % ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)x implies ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)y % ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)y,
as required. ￿
Since weak certainty independence implies constant absolute uncertainty aversion, this com-
pletes the proof of necessity. ￿
Strengthening state independence A.3￿ to monotonicity. Fix an unbounded mean disper-
sion representation of the preferences hU;￿;￿i, and let W be the associated functions representing
the corresponding preferences over state-utility vectors. It is immediate that u ￿ u0 implies
W(u) ￿ W (u0). We need to show that u ￿ u0 implies W(u) > W (u0). Suppose by way of
contradiction that there exists a u ￿ u0 such that W(u) = W (u0). Then there exists ￿ > 0
such that u ￿ u0 + ￿e. By lemma 18, W (u0 + ￿e) > W (u0) and hence W (u0 + ￿e) > W (u),
contradicting monotonicity. Conversely, it is immediate that W increasing implies monotonicity
of the underlying preferences.
Uniqueness of U and ￿. From the steps above, we have established V (f) = ￿ ￿ (U ￿ f) ￿
￿((U ￿ f) ￿ (￿ ￿ ((U ￿ f)))e), represents %, where, by lemma 13, U is an a¢ ne function that
represents % on constant acts. As is well-known, if we ￿x a > 0, and b in R, then the function
^ U (x) = aU (x) + b, is also an a¢ ne representation of % restricted to the set of constant acts.
Set ^ W (^ u) := ￿ ￿ ^ u ￿ ^ ￿(^ u ￿ (￿ ￿ ^ u)e), where ^ ￿(ad) = ￿(d), for all d in H0
￿. And set ^ V (f) :=
^ W
￿
^ U ￿ f
￿
. By construction we have ^ V (f) ￿ ^ V (g) if and only if ￿ ￿
￿
^ U ￿ f
￿




^ U ￿ f
￿￿
e) ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
^ U ￿ g
￿




^ U ￿ g
￿￿
e) if and only if ￿ ￿ (a(U ￿ f) + be) ￿
^ ￿(a(U ￿ f)￿a(￿ ￿ ((U ￿ f)))e) ￿ ￿ ￿(a(U ￿ g) + be)￿ ^ ￿(a(U ￿ g)￿a(￿ ￿ ((U ￿ g)))e) if and only
if a[￿ ￿(U ￿ f)￿￿((U ￿ f)￿(￿ ￿ ((U ￿ f)))e)] ￿ a[￿ ￿(U ￿ g)￿￿((U ￿ g)￿(￿ ￿ ((U ￿ g)))e)] if and
only if V (f) ￿ V (g). ￿
30Proof of the su¢ ciency of the axioms in theorem 2 part (1): ￿ non-negative. Unlike
the proof of theorem 1, we will not be able to use any ￿ 2 ￿(S). The key to the proof will be
to construct a particular probability vector ￿ such that there exists a (monotone, unbounded)
mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i of the preferences in which the dispersion function ￿ is
non-negative. We will use axiom A.6￿ to construct a ￿ that has this property.
Fix an unbounded a¢ ne U that represents the preferences over the constant acts, and let %u
be the associated induced preferences over state-utility vectors. From the proof of theorem 1,
we know that these induced preferences satisfy ordering, continuity, monotonicity and translation
invariance.
The proof proceeds by two lemmas.
Lemma 20 For any ￿nite set of acts f1;:::;fm in F that are indi⁄erent (that is, f1 ￿ fj
for all j = 2;:::;m): if for the convex combination a1f1 + ::: + amfm, the state-utility vector
U ￿ (a1f1 + ::: + amfm) 2 RS is a constant vector, then there exists a corresponding set of acts
^ f1;:::; ^ fm in F with U ￿ ^ fj = U ￿ fj for all j = 1;:::;m, (and hence, by the a¢ nity of U,
U ￿ (a1f1 + ::: + amfm) = U ￿
￿
a1 ^ f1 + ::: + am ^ fm
￿
), such that a1 ^ f1 + ::: + am ^ fm is a constant
act.
Proof. Let ￿ u = U ￿ (a1f1 + ::: + amfm). By unboundedness, we can ￿nd two lotteries ￿ z
and z such that ￿ z ￿ fj (s) ￿ z for all s in S and all j = 1;:::;m. De￿ne ^ fj by ^ fj (s) =
￿
fj






z ￿ fj (s). By state independence A.3￿ (which is implied by monotonicity),
^ fj ￿ fj for each j. Furthermore, since the preferences over constant acts respect independence,
[a1f1 + ::: + amfm](s) ￿
h
a1 ^ f1 + ::: + am ^ fm
i
(s) for all s in S. Hence, U￿(a1f1 + ::: + amfm) =
U ￿
￿
a1 ^ f1 + ::: + am ^ fm
￿





































































U (z) = ￿ u,
for every s in S. But since U (￿ z) > U (z), there is a unique ￿ in [0;1], satisfying, ￿ u = ￿U (￿ z) +
(1 ￿ ￿)U (z). Hence, ￿1￿
f1
s + ::: + ￿m￿
fm
s = ￿ for all s in S. Thus a1 ^ f1 + ::: + am ^ fm =
31￿￿ z + (1 ￿ ￿)z, is a constant act as required. ￿
For any state-utility vector u0, let U (u0) = fu00 2 Rn : u00 %u u0g be the (weak) upper contour
set of u0 with respect to the induced preference relation %u. Our axioms do not imply that these
upper contour sets are convex, hence some utility vectors might not lie in supporting hyperplanes
of their upper contour sets. The next lemma shows, however, that all constant utility vectors lie
on supporting hyperplanes of their upper contour sets.
Lemma 21 (supporting hyperplane for constant acts) Given preference for complete hedges
A.6￿, for all constant acts x in X, the constant vector U ￿x lies in a supporting hyperplane of its
weak upper contour set U (U ￿ x).
Proof. Suppose not. Consider the convex hull of the upper contour set of U ￿x. Since U ￿x
does not lie in a supporting hyperplane of the upper contour set, U ￿ x must lie in the interior of
this convex hull. Therefore, there exists a constant act y ￿ x such that the utility vector U ￿ y
also lies in the convex hull. By de￿nition, U ￿ y is not in the upper contour set. Using a mild
extension of Caratheodory￿ s Theorem (see Rockafellar (1970, p.155)), we claim that there exist
n + 1 points on the boundary of the upper contour set (i.e., points indi⁄erent to U ￿ x) such that
U ￿ y is a convex combination of these points.
By Caratheodory￿ s Theorem, we know that any u0 in the convex hull of a set S ￿ Rn can be
expressed as a convex combination of at most n + 1 points in the set. Suppose (as in our case)
the set S is closed and the point u0 is not the set itself. Let k + 1 ￿ n + 1 be the number of
distinct points in S are used to construct u0 as a convex combination each with positive weight.
That is, u0 = ￿1u1 + ::: + ￿kuk + ￿k+1uk+1. Without loss of generality, we will show that we
can choose another point ^ uk+1 on the boundary of S such that the convex combination ^ ￿1u1 +:::
+^ ￿kuk+^ ￿k+1^ uk+1 = u0. Let u00 := ￿1u1+:::+￿kuk where ￿j = ￿j=(1 ￿ ￿k+1). By construction,
(1 ￿ ￿k+1)u00+￿k+1uk+1 = u0: Suppose uk+1 was not on the boundary of S. Since S is closed and
u0 = 2 S, there must exist a ￿ 2 (￿k+1;1) such that ^ uk+1 := (1 ￿ ￿)u00+￿uk+1 lies on the boundary
of S. Set ^ ￿k+1 := ￿k+1=￿ and, for each j = 1;:::;k, set ^ ￿j := ￿j (1 ￿ ^ ￿k+1)=(1 ￿ ￿k+1). By
construction (1 ￿ ^ ￿k+1)u00 + ^ ￿k+1^ uk+1 = u0: And ^ ￿1u1 +:::+ ^ ￿kuk + ^ ￿k+1^ uk+1 = u0. Repeating
32this step k + 1 times completes the argument.
Since u ￿ y can be expressed as a convex combination of a ￿nite number of points indi⁄erent
to u ￿ x, by lemma 20, there exist a ￿nite number of acts indi⁄erent to x such that a convex
combination of those indi⁄erent acts yields a constant act indi⁄erent to y ￿ x. But this contradicts
preference for complete hedges, A.6￿. ￿
Completing the proof that the axioms are su¢ cient in theorem 2 part 1. By lemma
21, there exists a supporting hyperplane H0
￿ of the upper contour set through 0. By monotonicity,
￿ ￿ 0. By the mean-dispersion theorem 1, we can ￿nd a representation hU;￿;￿i. Let W(u) =
￿ ￿ u ￿ ￿(u ￿ ￿ ￿ u) be the associated mean-dispersion representation of the induced preferences
%u. Suppose that ￿ is not non-negative. Then there exists a di⁄erence vector d 2 H0
￿, such that
￿(d) < 0. Then W (d) = ￿￿(d) > 0, contradicting the de￿nition of H0
￿. ￿
Proof of the necessity of the axioms in theorem 2 part (1). Fix a (monotone, unbounded)
mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ non-negative, and let W be the associated function
representing the corresponding preferences %u over state-utility vectors. Notice that since ￿(0) = 0
and ￿ ￿ 0, for all ￿ 2 R and state-utility vectors u0 2 Rn: if u0 ￿u ￿e then ￿ ￿ u0 ￿ ￿. Therefore,
if ￿0e is a convex combination of utility vectors that are indi⁄erent to ￿e, then ￿0 ￿ ￿, and hence
W (￿0e) ￿ W (￿e). Given lemma 15, this implies axiom A.6￿. ￿
Proof of su¢ ciency of the axioms in theorem 2 part (2): ￿ non-negative and convex.
Since axiom A.6 implies axiom A.6￿, we know from part (1) that that there exists a (monotone
unbounded) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ non-negative.
To show that the convexity axiom A.6 implies that ￿ is convex, suppose that ￿ is not convex.
Then there exists two di⁄erence vectors d and d0 in H0
￿ and an ￿ in (0;1) such that
￿(￿d + (1 ￿ ￿)d0) > ￿￿(d) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(d0).
Let ￿ and ￿0 be such that ￿ ￿ ￿(d) = ￿0 ￿ ￿(d0). Let u be the utility vector such that ￿ = ￿ ￿ u
and d = u ￿ ￿e. Similarly, let u0 be the utility vector such that ￿0 = ￿ ￿ u0 and d0 = u0 ￿ ￿0e. By
33construction, W (u) = W (u0), but
W (￿u + (1 ￿ ￿)u0) = [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿0] ￿ ￿(￿u + (1 ￿ ￿)u0)
< [￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿0] ￿ [￿￿(d) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(d00)]
= ￿W (u) + (1 ￿ ￿)W (u0);
which contradicts convexity of the preferences %u. But the convexity axiom A.6 implies that
%uare convex. ￿
Proof of necessity of the axioms in theorem 2 part (2). Fix a (monotone, unbounded)
mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ convex. Convexity of the underlying preferences
follows immediately. ￿
Proof of su¢ ciency of the axioms in theorem 2 part (3): ￿ linear homogenous. By theorem
1, there exists a (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i. Let W be the
associated representation of preferences over state utility vectors. For any di⁄erence vector d 2 H0
￿.
We have W (d) = ￿￿(d); that is, d ￿ ￿￿(d)e. By certainty equivalent betweenness, axiom A.7,
for any ￿ 2 (0;1), W(￿d + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿(d)e)) = ￿￿(d). But W(￿d + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿(d)e)) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(d))￿￿(￿d). Hence ￿(￿d) = ￿￿(d) for all ￿ 2 (0;1). To show linear homogeneity for
￿ > 1, ￿x d0, let d = ￿d0 and ￿ = 1=￿. Hence ￿(￿d0) = ￿(d) = (1=￿)￿(￿d) = ￿￿(d=￿) = ￿￿(d0).
Thus ￿ is linearly homogenous. ￿
Proof of necessity of the axioms in theorem 2 part (3). Fix a (monotone, unbounded)
mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i with ￿ linear homogenous. It is enough to show that, for
the induced preferences over state-utility vectors, for all state utility vectors u 2 Rn and ￿ 2 (0;1),
u ￿u ￿e implies ￿u + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e ￿u ￿e. Let d := u ￿ (￿ ￿ u)e By the representation, W (u) =
￿ ￿ u ￿ ￿(d) = ￿. And W (￿u + (1 ￿ ￿)￿e) = ￿￿ ￿ u + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿(￿d) = ￿￿ ￿ u ￿ ￿￿(d) +
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ = ￿, where the second last equality uses linear homogeneity of ￿. ￿
Proof of su¢ ciency of the axioms in theorem 2 part (4): ￿ symmetric. As in part (1),
the key to the proof will be to construct a probability vector ￿ 2 ￿(S) such that there exists
a (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i of the preferences in which
34the dispersion function ￿ is symmetric. We will use axiom A.8 to construct the ￿ that has this
property.
Fix an unbounded a¢ ne U that represents the preferences over the constant acts, and let %u
be the associated induced preferences over state-utility vectors. From the proof of theorem 1,
we know that these induced preferences satisfy ordering, continuity, monotonicity and translation
invariance.
We ￿rst ￿nd the property of state utility vectors that corresponds to complementarity of the
underlying acts, and the property of preferences over state-utility vectors that corresponds to
axiom A.8.
Lemma 22 (complementary vectors) The acts f and ￿ f are complementary if and only if
U ￿ f + U ￿ ￿ f = ke for some k 2 R.
Proof. Since f is complementary to ￿ f, 1
2U (f (s)) + 1
2U
￿ ￿ f (s)
￿
= 1
2U (f (s0)) + 1
2U
￿ ￿ f (s0)
￿
for all
s. Set k=2 as the constant to which all these terms are equal, hence U (f (s)) + U
￿ ￿ f (s)
￿
= k, for
all s. That is, U ￿ f + U ￿ ￿ f = ke. Conversely, if two utility vectors are such that u + ￿ u = ke
then any two acts f and ￿ f such that U ￿f = u and U ￿ ￿ f = ￿ u, have the property that U (f (s))+
U
￿ ￿ f (s)
￿
= k, for all s. Hence, 1
2f (s) + 1
2
￿ f (s) ￿ 1
2f (s0) + 1
2
￿ f (s0) for all pairs of states s and s0.
Hence the underlying acts are complementary. ￿
>From here on, we will de￿ne two utility vectors u and ￿ u as complementary if u + ￿ u = ke for
some k 2 R.
De￿nition (additivity for complementary pairs) For any two pairs of complementary util-
ity vectors (u; ￿ u) and (u0￿ u0): if u ￿u ￿ u and u0 ￿u ￿ u0 then ￿u + ￿u0 ￿u ￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0 for all
￿;￿ ￿ 0.
Lemma 23 (complementarity , additivity) The induced preferences %u exhibit ￿ additivity
for complementary pairs￿if and only if the underlying preferences % satisfy axiom A.8, comple-
mentary independence.
Proof. (Su¢ ciency) Fix two pairs of complementary utility vectors (u; ￿ u) and (u0; ￿ u0) and ￿x
35￿;￿ ￿ 0. Suppose u ￿u ￿ u and u0 ￿u ￿ u0. Since the pairs are complementary, by lemma 22, there
exist k;k0 in R, such that u = k ￿ ￿ u and u0 = k0 ￿ ￿ u0.




and (g; ￿ g), satisfying U￿f = (￿ + ￿)u, U￿ ￿ f = (￿ + ￿) ￿ u,
U ￿ g = (￿ + ￿)u0 and U ￿ g = (￿ + ￿) ￿ u0. These pairs are complementary since U ￿ f + U ￿ ￿ f =
(￿ + ￿)(u + ￿ u) = (￿ + ￿)k and similarly, U ￿ g + U ￿ ￿ g = (￿ + ￿)k0. Let x0 be the constant act
for which U (x0) = 0.
We ￿rst show that f ￿ ￿ f and g ￿ ￿ g. There are two cases.
Case (i) ￿ + ￿ ￿ 1. Suppose f ￿ ￿ f fails, and without loss of generality suppose f ￿ ￿ f. By
continuity there exists ￿ > 0, and an act ^ f, satisfying U ￿ ^ f = U ￿ f ￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)e and ^ f ￿ ￿ f. By
construction, ^ f is complementary with ￿ f. Since (x0;x0) is trivially a complementary pair with










￿ + ￿ ￿ 1
￿ + ￿
x0.




























Thus, the above indi⁄erence implies, u ￿ ￿e ￿u ￿ u ￿u u contradicting the monotonicity of %u.22
The argument is the same for g and ￿ g.
Case (ii) ￿+￿ < 1. Let
￿
f00; ￿ f00￿
be the complementary pair of acts for which U ￿f00 = u and
U ￿ ￿ f00 = ￿ u. Hence f00 ￿ ￿ f00. Recall (x0;x0) is trivially a complementary pair with x0 ￿ x0. So,
by applying A.8 complementary independence, we have
(￿ + ￿)f00 + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)x0 ￿ (￿ + ￿) ￿ f00 + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)x0
But U￿[(￿ + ￿)f00 + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)x0] = (￿ + ￿)U (f00) = U￿f and U￿
￿
(￿ + ￿) ￿ f00 + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)x0
￿
= U ￿ ￿ f. Thus, the above indi⁄erence implies f ￿ ￿ f. Similarly, it follows g ￿ ￿ g.




and (g; ￿ g) for ￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿) yields ￿f +
22 In fact, even without monotonicity, this contradicts the conclusion of lemma 18.
36(1 ￿ ￿)g ￿ ￿ ￿ f + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ g. And since
U ￿ (￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g) =
￿
￿ + ￿
U ￿ f +
￿
￿ + ￿
U ￿ g = ￿u + ￿u0
and U ￿
￿





U ￿ ￿ f +
￿
￿ + ￿
U ￿ ￿ g = ￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0,
we have ￿u + ￿u0 ￿u ￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0, as required.




, (g; ￿ g) and ￿ in (0;1). Set ￿ := ￿ and
￿ := (1 ￿ ￿). Set u := U ￿ f, ￿ u := U ￿ ￿ f, u0 := U ￿ g and ￿ u0 := U ￿ ￿ g. Without loss of generality,
suppose u %u ￿ u and u0 %u ￿ u0.
If u ￿u ￿ u and u0 ￿u ￿ u0 then, by additivity for complementary pairs ￿u + ￿u0 ￿u ￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0.
Hence for the underlying preferences, we have: ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g ￿ ￿ ￿ f + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ g, as required. If
either of the preferences are strict, for example, say u ￿u ￿ u, then by monotonicity and continuity
of % there exists an act ^ f and ￿ > 0, such that U ￿ ^ f = u ￿ ￿e ￿u ￿ u. By construction ^ f
is complementary to ￿ f, so by additivity for complementary pairs we have ￿(u ￿ ￿e) + ￿u0 ￿u
￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0. Hence by monotonicity of %u it follows that ￿u + ￿u0 ￿u ￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0 and thus for the
underlying preferences we have: ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)g ￿ ￿ ￿ f + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ g, as required. ￿
We now select the ￿ that we will use in the mean-dispersion representation. Following Sinis-
calchi, we select the (unique) probability vector ￿ such that for any two complementary utility
vectors u and ￿ u, u % ￿ u if and only if ￿u ￿ ￿￿ u. To show that such a vector exists, we will construct
it explicitly.
By lemma 22, for any utility vector u, the set of vectors complementary to u is given by
f(ke ￿ u) 2 Rn : k 2 Rg. By continuity and monotonicity of %u, there is a unique complementary
vector (￿ ke ￿ u) such that (￿ ke ￿ u) ￿ u.
In particular, let es denote the unit vector with a 1 in the sth position and zeros elsewhere.
For each state s, there is a unique ks such that kse ￿ es ￿u es. That is, kse ￿ es is the unique
vector that is both complementary to and indi⁄erent to es. Set ￿s := ks=2. By monotonicity of
%u, we have ￿s 2 [0;1].
To show that
Pn
s=1 ￿s = 1, notice that (by construction) for each s, the pair (2￿se ￿ es;es) is
a complementary pair and the elements are indi⁄erent to each other. Therefore by lemma 23 we
37can apply the ￿ additivity for complementary pairs￿n ￿ 1 times to obtain:
Pn
s=1 (2￿se ￿ es) ￿u
Pn
s=1 es. That is, [
Pn
s=1 2￿s ￿ 1]e ￿u e which implies
Pn
s=1 ￿s = 1.
Lemma 24 (complementarity and equal mean) For the ￿ constructed above and any two
complementary vectors u and ￿ u: u %u ￿ u if and only if ￿ ￿ u ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ u.23
Proof. Fix a vector u, and index the set of complementary vectors by k using the de￿nition
￿ uk := ke ￿ u. By monotonicity, ￿ uk %u ￿ uk
0
if and only if k ￿ k0. Moreover, ￿ ￿ ￿ uk = k ￿ ￿ ￿ u
therefore ￿ ￿ ￿ uk ￿ ￿ ￿ u if and only if k ￿ 2(￿ ￿ u).
Recall that, by construction, (2￿se ￿ es;es) is a complementary pair and the two state-utility
vectors are indi⁄erent to each other. Applying additivity for complementary pairs n ￿ 1 times
(using us as ￿) we obtain:
n X
s=1




) 2(￿ ￿ u)e ￿ u ￿u u.
Therefore, ￿ uk %u u if and only if k ￿ 2(￿ ￿ u). ￿
(To see that this ￿ constructed above is the unique probability vector with this property,
recall that for the utility vector es, there is a unique complementary vector kse ￿ es such that
es ￿ kse ￿ es. But, for any ~ ￿ 2 ￿(S), if ~ ￿es = ~ ￿ (kse ￿ es) then ~ ￿s = 2ks; that is, ~ ￿ = ￿.)
To complete the proof of su¢ ciency: let hU;￿;￿i be the mean-dispersion representation of the
underlying preferences corresponding to the U we ￿xed and the ￿ we just constructed. It remains
to show that corresponding ￿ is negatively symmetric: that is ￿(d) = ￿(￿d) for all d 2 H0
￿.
To see this, let W be the corresponding representation of the induced preferences %u: that is,
W (u) = ￿ ￿u￿￿(u ￿ (￿ ￿ u)e). Thus, for all d 2 H0
￿, ￿(d) = ￿W (d). For all d 2 H0
￿, ￿ ￿d = 0 =
￿ ￿ (￿d). Therefore, by lemma 24, W (d) = W (￿d), and hence ￿(d) = ￿(￿d), as required. ￿
Proof of necessary of the axioms in theorem 2 part (4): Fix a (monotone, unbounded)
mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i for which ￿(d) = ￿(￿d), for all d 2 H0
￿. It is enough to
show that the associated preferences over state-utility vectors, %u, satisfy the property ￿ additivity
23 This result is essentially Siniscalchi￿ s observation 1.
38for complementary pairs￿since lemma 23 shows that this means the underlying preferences %
satisfy axiom A.8. Therefore, consider the associated preferences %u over state-utility vectors,
which are given by: W (u) = ￿ ￿ u ￿ ￿(u ￿ (￿ ￿ u)e).
Fix a vector u, and let d := u￿(￿ ￿ u)e. As in the proof of lemma 24, index the set of vectors
complementary to u by k using the de￿nition ￿ uk := ke ￿ u. For all complementary vectors ￿ uk,
notice that ￿ ￿ ￿ uk = k ￿￿ ￿u and that ￿ dk := ￿ uk ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ uk￿
e = (ke ￿ u)￿(k ￿ ￿ ￿ u)e = ￿d. Thus,
since ￿(d) = ￿(￿d), W (u) ￿ W
￿
￿ uk￿
if and only if ￿ ￿ ￿ uk = ￿ ￿ u.
Fix ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0, and two pairs of complementary utility vectors (u; ￿ u) and (u0￿ u0) such that
u ￿u ￿ u and u0 ￿u ￿ u0. We need to show that ￿u+￿u0 ￿u ￿￿ u+￿￿ u0. From the argument above, we
know that ￿￿ ￿ u = ￿￿u and ￿￿ ￿ u0 = ￿￿u0. Thus ￿￿(￿u+￿u0) = ￿￿(￿￿ u+￿￿ u0). Let k and k0 be such
that ke = u + ￿ u, and k0e = u0 + ￿ u0. Notice that (￿u + ￿u0) + (￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0) = (￿k + ￿k0)e, therefore
￿u + ￿u0 and ￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0 are complementary vectors. Thus, by the argument above, ￿u + ￿u0 ￿u
￿￿ u + ￿￿ u0 as required. ￿
Proof of corollary 3, part (1) (weak ambiguity aversion). The concept of ￿weak ambiguity
aversion￿was introduced by Ghirardato & Marinacci (2002). Informally, an agent is weakly am-
biguity averse if they are more ambiguity averse than some subjective expected utility maximizer.
More formally,
De￿nition 6 (Weak Ambiguity Aversion (Ghirardato & Marinacci [2002])) The prefer-
ences % are weakly ambiguity averse if there exists a ￿ 2 ￿(S) and an expected utility function
U on constant acts such that for all constant acts x and all acts f, U (x) ￿ ￿ ￿ (U ￿ f) =) x % f
and U (x) > ￿ ￿ (U ￿ f) =) x ￿ f.
To show that the (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion preferences hU;￿;￿i with ￿ non-
negative satisfy weak ambiguity aversion, let the subjective expected utility preferences be given
by the utility function U and the prior ￿. Fix a constant act x. By construction, the upper
contour set at U ￿ x in state utility space induced by the subjective expected utility preferences
is H
U(x)
￿ . But since ￿ ￿ 0, this same hyperplane is a supporting hyperplane of the upper contour
set at U ￿x of the preferences %u induced by the mean-dispersion preferences hU;￿;￿i. Since this
39holds for any constant act, the conclusion follows.
To show that ￿weak ambiguity aversion￿implies A.6￿ (and hence, by theorem 2(1), implies
that ￿ is non-negative), let U and ￿ de￿ne a subjective expected utility relation with respect to
which the preferences % are weakly ambiguity averse. Notice that, by de￿nition, U represents
the preferences over constant acts. Fix a collection of indi⁄erent acts f1;:::;fm and let ^ x be the
constant act such that some convex combination of the indi⁄erent acts a1f1+:::+amfm = ^ x. We
need to show that ^ x % f1. Let xf1 be a certainty equivalent of f1 (and hence of f2;:::;fm), and
let u0 = U(xf1). By ambiguity aversion, ￿￿(U ￿ fj) ￿ U (xf1) = u0. That is, for each j, the utility
vector U ￿ fj lies above the hyperplane Hu
0
￿ that is the induced indi⁄erence set (according to the
subjective expected utility preferences de￿ned by U and ￿) through u0e = U ￿ xf1. Therefore,
their convex combination U ￿ ^ x also lies above Hu
0
￿ . Hence ^ x % xf1 ￿ f1. ￿
Part (2) (Variational preferences) The equivalence of (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion
preferences that admit a representation in which ￿ non-negative and convex with variational pref-
erences follows from the fact that Maccheroni et al.￿ s axioms characterizing these preferences are
the same as those in part (2) of theorem 2 except that Maccheroni et al. have weak certainty
independence in place of the slightly weaker constant absolute uncertainty aversion. However,
lemma 19 shows that our axioms imply weak certainty independence. ￿
Part (3) (Invariant biseparable preferences). The equivalence of (monotone, unbounded)
mean-dispersion preferences with a ￿ that is linear homogeneous with invariant biseparable pref-
erences follows from the fact that Ghirardato et al￿ s axioms characterizing these preferences are
the same as those in part (3) of theorem 2 except they have certainty independence in place
constant absolute uncertainty aversion A.5 and certainty equivalent betweenness A.6. It is im-
mediate that certainty independence implies A.5 and A.6. Lemma 19 shows that our axioms
imply Maccheroni et al￿ s weak certainty independence. And it is immediate that weak certainty
independence combined with A.6 implies certainty independence. ￿
Part (4) (Vector Expected Utility) The equivalence of (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion
preferences with a ￿ that is symmetric with vector expected utility follows from the fact that Sinis-
40calchi￿ s axioms characterizing these preferences (in an unbounded domain) are the same as those in
part (4) of theorem 2 except he has weak certainty independence in place of constant absolute un-
certainty aversion A.5. But Lemma 19 shows that our axioms imply weak certainty independence.
￿
Part (5) (Multiple Priors). The equivalence of (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion pref-
erences with a ￿ that is non-negative, convex and linear homogeneous with multiple priors follows
from the fact that Gilboa-Schmeidler axioms combine those of variational preferences (part 2) and
invariant biseparable preferences (part 3). ￿
Part (6) (Choquet Expected utility). The equivalence of (monotone, unbounded) mean-
dispersion preferences with a ￿ that is linear homogeneous and additive for comonotonic dispersion
vectors, with Choquet expected utility follows from the fact that Choquet expected utility is the
subclass of invariant biseparable preferences that are additive for comonotonic acts. Schmeidler
(1989) showed that such preferences admit a representation given by the Choquet integral of the
induced state-utility vector with respect to a capacity ￿, which is a function that assigns to each
event a number in [0;1]. The capacity is normalized (that is, ￿ (?) = 0 and ￿ (S) = 1) and
monotonic with respect to set-inclusion (that is, A ￿ B implies ￿ (A) ￿ ￿ (B).) Formally, the





￿(1 ￿ ￿ (fs 2 S : u0
s ￿ ug))du +
Z 1
0
￿ (fs 2 S : u0
s ￿ ug)du.
As is well-known, if two state-utility vectors u0 u00 are comonotonic, (that is, for any pair of states




^ s) ￿ 0), then the Choquet integral of the sum of these two vectors with
respect to the capacity ￿, satis￿es
Z





Since any constant utility vector ￿e is comonotonic with respect to any other state-utility vector,




(u0 ￿ (￿ ￿ u0)e+(￿ ￿ u0)e)d￿
= (￿ ￿ u0) +
Z
(u0 ￿ (￿ ￿ u0)e)d￿.
41Set ￿(d) := ￿
R
(d)d￿, and by construction, we have for all comonotonic d;d0 2 H0
￿, and all a > 0,
￿(d + d0) = ￿(d) + ￿(d0) and ￿(ad) = a￿(d),
as required. ￿￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Su¢ ciency: Suppose ￿ 2 ￿(S) satis￿es the core condition. Let U be
an (unbounded) a¢ ne utility function that represents % restricted to constant acts, and let x0
be the constant act for which U ￿ x0 = 0. We shall show that H0
￿ is a supporting hyperplane for
the upper contour set of %u at 0. To see this, for each u 2 H0
￿, pick an act g for which U ￿ g =
u. By construction, E￿ (U ￿ g) = 0, and so for the constant act E￿ (g), we have U (E￿ (g)) = 0.
Thus, x0 % E￿ (g) and so by the core condition, x0 % g, which in turn implies 0 %u u, as required.
Repeating the steps after the proof of Lemma 21 of the proof of the su¢ ciency of the axioms
in theorem 2 part 1, establishes we can use the hyperplane H0
￿ to construct a mean-dispersion
representation with a non-negative ￿. ￿
Necessity: Suppose hU;￿;￿i is a mean-dispersion representation of the preferences with ￿ non-
negative. Fix a pair of acts f and g, such that f % E￿ (g). By de￿nition V (g) = E￿ (U ￿ g) ￿
￿(U ￿ g ￿ (E￿ (U ￿ g))e) ￿ E￿ (U ￿ g), since ￿(:) is non-negative, which equals V (E￿ (g)). Hence
f % g. As this holds for any f and g, such that f % E￿ (g), we have that ￿ satis￿es the core
condition, as required.
By construction, core(%) is the intersection of ￿(S) with the dual cone of the upper contour
set fu : u %u 0eg, hence core(%) is closed and convex. ￿
Proof of proposition 6. (a))(b). Consider the graph of ￿ in H0
￿ ￿ R. (Notice that, up to a
change of bases, the epigraph of ￿ is the upper contour set fu : u %u 0eg in Rn.) It is enough
to show that, for any vector d in H0
￿, lim￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] exists and is equal to zero. Since ￿ ￿ 0,
the quotient in the brackets is bounded below by 0. Therefore, ￿x a d 2 H0
￿ and, without loss of
generality, let kdk = 1. By way of contradiction, suppose limsup￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] = 2b > 0. Consider
the vector (d;b) in H0
￿ ￿ R. By axiom A.9, there exists an ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] such that ￿b > ￿(￿d) for
all ￿ 2 (0; ￿ ￿). That is, ￿(￿d)=￿ < b for all ￿ < ￿ ￿, but this contradicts limsup￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] =
2b > 0. Since the choice of d was arbitrary, this proves that all directional derivatives are equal
42to 0; that is, ￿0 (0) = 0. Since W(u) := ￿ ￿ u + ￿(u ￿ (￿ ￿ u)e), it follows that that W is Gateaux
di⁄erentiable at 0, and that rW (0) = ￿.
(b))(a). Suppose that axiom A.9 does not hold. That is, there exists a d 2 H0
￿ (without loss
of generality, we can let kdk = 1) and a b > 0 such that, for all ￿0 2 (0;1] there exists an ￿ 2 (0;￿0)
such that 0e ￿u ￿(be + d); that is, ￿(￿d) ￿ ￿b. But then there is a sequence of ￿t ! 0 such that
￿(￿td)=￿t ￿ b > 0. But this contradicts lim￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] = 0 and hence contradicts ￿0 (0) = 0.
To prove uniqueness of ￿, ￿x a (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i
with ￿ ￿ 0 and consider the corresponding preferences %u over state utility vectors. Suppose that
there exists a ^ ￿ 6= ￿ and ^ ￿ such that ^ ￿ is non-negative and hU; ^ ￿;^ ￿i represents the same preferences.
Then both hyperplanes H0
￿ and H0
^ ￿ must support the upper contour set fu : u %u 0eg. Since ^ ￿ 6= ￿,
there exists a state-utility vector u such that ^ ￿ ￿ u > 0 > ￿ ￿ u. By axiom A.9 (using U ￿ g = u,
U (xf) = 0, and ^ ￿) there exists an ￿ 2 (0;1) such that ￿u ￿u 0e. But 0 > ￿ ￿ ￿u, which violates
H0
￿ being a supporting hyperplane of fu : u %u 0eg.
To prove the converse for the case of A.6 holds in place of A.6￿, let ￿ be the unique probability
vector admissible with a mean-dispersion representation with ￿ ￿ 0. By theorem 2 we know
that ￿ is convex, hence W is concave. The graph of W in Rn+1 contains the line ￿e for ￿ 2 R
and e 2 Rn+1 (this is true whether or not ￿ is convex). Therefore, if H0
￿ is the only supporting
hyperplane of fu : u %u 0eg, there is a unique supporting hyperplane to the hypograph of W, and
hence W is Gateaux di⁄erentiable at 0 with gradient rW (0) = ￿. This implies ￿ is Gateaux
di⁄erentiable with ￿0 (0) = 0, so we are done.
In the convex case, we can also replace the (b))(a) proof above by a constructive argument.
Fix a g such that x(g;￿) ￿ xf, let u = U ￿g and, without loss of generality (because of translation
invariance), let u(xf) = 0: that is, ￿ ￿ u > 0. It is enough to show that there exists an ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1]
such that for all ￿ 2 (0; ￿ ￿) W (￿u) > 0. Let ￿
￿ := argmax￿2[￿1;1] W (￿u). Since rW (0) = ￿
and u does not lie in H0
￿, ￿
￿ > 0. But then, by the concavity W, W (￿u) > 0 for all ￿ 2 (0;￿
￿);
and, setting ￿ ￿ := ￿
￿, we are done.. ￿
Proof of proposition 7. Let ￿ satisfy the condition in axiom A.9￿. By theorem 1, there exists
a (unbounded monotone) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i involving this ￿. Consider the
43graph of ￿ in H0
￿￿R. (Notice that, up to a change of bases, the epigraph of ￿ is the upper contour
set fu : u %u 0eg in Rn.) It is enough to show that, for any vector d in H0
￿, lim￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿]
exists and is equal to zero. Therefore, ￿x a d 2 H0
￿ and, without loss of generality, let kdk = 1.
By way of contradiction, suppose limsup￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] = 2b > 0. Consider the vector (d;b) in
H0
￿ ￿ R. By axiom A.9￿, there exists an ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] such that ￿b > ￿(￿d) for all ￿ 2 (0; ￿ ￿). That
is, ￿(￿d)=￿ < b for all ￿ < ￿ ￿, but this contradicts limsup￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] = 2b > 0. Now suppose
by way of contradiction, suppose liminf￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] = 2b < 0. Consider the vector (d;b) in
H0
￿ ￿ R. By axiom A.9￿, there exists an ^ ￿ 2 (0;1] such that ￿b < ￿(￿d) for all ￿ 2 (0; ^ ￿). That
is, ￿(￿d)=￿ > b for all ￿ < ￿ ￿, but this contradicts liminf￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] = 2b < 0. Since the choice
of d was arbitrary, this proves that all directional derivatives are equal to 0; that is, ￿0 (0) = 0.
Since W(u) := ￿ ￿ u + ￿(u ￿ (￿ ￿ u)e), it follows that that W is Gateaux di⁄erentiable at 0, and
that rW (0) = ￿.
Conversely, given the representation hU;￿;￿i, it is enough to show that ￿ satis￿es the condition
in axiom A.9￿. Suppose not. Then there exists a d 2 H0
￿ (without loss of generality, we can let
kdk = 1) and a b 6= 0 (without loss of generality take b > 0) such that, for all ￿0 2 (0;1] there
exists an ￿ 2 (0;￿0) such that 0e ￿u ￿(be + d); that is, ￿(￿d) ￿ ￿b. But then there is a sequence
of ￿t ! 0 such that ￿(￿td)=￿t ￿ b > 0. But this contradicts lim￿#0 [￿(￿d)=￿] = 0 and hence
contradicts ￿0 (0) = 0.
To prove uniqueness of ￿, ￿x a (monotone, unbounded) mean-dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i
with ￿ ￿ 0 and consider the corresponding preferences %u over state-utility vectors. Suppose
that there exists a ^ ￿ 6= ￿ and ^ ￿ such that ^ ￿ has the same desired properties as ￿, and hU; ^ ￿;^ ￿i
represents the same preferences. By the argument in the previous paragraph, both ￿ and ^ ￿ satisfy
the condition in axiom A.9￿. Since ^ ￿ 6= ￿, there exists a state-utility vector u such that ^ ￿ ￿ u >
0 > ￿ ￿ u. By axiom A.9￿, there exists an ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that for all ￿ 2 (0; ￿ ￿), ￿u ￿u 0e, and
there exists an ^ ￿ 2 (0;1) such that for all ￿ 2 (0; ^ ￿), 0e ￿u ￿u: a contradiction. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8. Preliminaries. Notice that, ￿xing U, for any other mean-
dispersion representation hU; ^ ￿;^ ￿i of the preferences with corresponding ^ W, we have W(u) =
^ W (u) = E^ ￿ (u)￿^ ￿(u ￿ E^ ￿ (u)e) since W and ^ W represent the same underlying preferences with
44the same normalization: W (￿e) = ^ W (￿e) = ￿ for all k 2 R. Therefore, if it exists, the (Dini)









(a))(b). Let ^ u be a state-utility vector. Let ^ ￿ minimize ￿ ￿ ^ u over core(%). Since core(%)
is closed and convex, ^ ￿ 2 bd(core(%)). If u0 := ￿^ u + ￿e for some ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 R, then ^ ￿ also
minimizes ￿ ￿ u0 over core(%).
Since ^ ￿ is in the core, by proposition 4, the preferences also admit a (monotone, unbounded)
mean-dispersion representation hU; ^ ￿;^ ￿i with ^ ￿ ￿ 0. Let ^ d 2 H0
^ ￿ be given by ^ u ￿ E^ ￿(^ u)e. With-













equal to zero. Similar to the proof of proposition 6, consider the graph of ^ ￿ in H0
￿ ￿ R. Notice
that, up to a change of bases, the epigraph of ^ ￿ is the upper contour set fu : u %u 0eg in Rn.






















￿ ￿ R; that is, the state-utility
vector ^ d+^ be. Notice that ^ d+^ be = ^ u+ ^ ￿e for ^ ￿ := (^ b￿E￿ (^ u)) and hence ￿￿
￿
^ d +^ be
￿
achieves its
minimum over core(%) at ^ ￿. Since ^ ￿ ￿ ^ d = 0 and ^ ￿ ￿e = 1, that minimum is ^ b > 0. Hence E￿(^ d+
^ be) ￿u 0 for all ￿ 2 core(%). Thus, by axiom A.9￿￿, there exists an ￿ ￿ 2 (0;1] such that ￿
￿
^ d +^ be
￿






















and is equal to zero, and hence the directional directional derivative W0 (0; ^ u) = ^ ￿ ￿ ^ u. ￿
(b))(a). Suppose axiom A.9￿￿ fails. Then there exists acts f and g such that E￿(g) ￿ xf for
all ￿ 2 core(%) but for all ￿0 2 (0;1] there exists an ￿ 2 (0;￿0] such that xf % ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)xf.
Without loss of generality, let U ￿ f = 0, and let ^ u := U ￿ g. Let ^ ￿ 2 bd(core(%)) minimize ￿ ￿ ^ u
over core(%) and again consider the representation hU; ^ ￿;^ ￿i. Let ^ b := E^ ￿(^ u)e > 0 where the last
inequality follows from E￿(g) ￿ xf. Let ^ d 2 H0





￿ = 1. Therefore, for all ￿0 2 (0;1] there exists an ￿ 2 (0;￿0] such that 0e %u
￿
￿
^ d +^ be
￿

















> 0. Thus, if it exists, the Dini directional derivative of
W0 (0; ^ u) exceeds ^ ￿ ￿ ^ u. ￿
45[core(%) ￿ Dini superdi⁄erential] By (b), for all ^ u, W0 (0; ^ u) exists and equals ^ ￿ ￿ ^ u where ^ ￿
minimizes ￿ ￿ ^ u over the core. Therefore, if ￿ is in core(%) then h￿;￿i ￿ W0 (0e;￿).
[Dini superdi⁄erential￿ core(%)]. Recall that core(%) is convex and closed. Therefore, if ￿
is not in the core, we can ￿nd a ^ u such that ￿ ￿ ^ u < ^ ￿ ￿ ^ u where ^ ￿ minimizes ^ ￿ ￿ ^ u on core(%). We
know W0 (0e; ^ u) = ^ ￿ ￿ ^ u hence ￿ ￿ ^ u < W0 (0e; ^ u) hence ￿ is not in Dini-Superdi⁄erential ￿
Proof of proposition 9 (probabilistic sophistication I)









for all x 2 X. We need to show f ￿ g. But since the probability distributions over
utilities induced by ￿ and U from f and g are the same, their mean utilities with respect to ￿ are
the same, and the probability distribution of di⁄erences from the mean are the same. Hence by
expression (1), the dispersion measures will be the same. Hence they are indi⁄erent.
(a))(b). We know from theorem 1 there exists a mean dispersion representation hU;￿;￿i
(that is, one involving ￿). Recall from the construction ￿ in the proof of theorem 1, for each d in
H0
￿, ￿(d) := ￿W (d) where W (d)e ￿u d. Next consider two state-utility functions d and d0 in H0
￿
with the property given on the left side of expression (1). That is, these two state utility functions
induce the same distribution over utilities with respect to ￿, hence by probabilistic sophistication,
they must indi⁄erent. Since d and d0 both have mean 0, it follows that ￿(d) = ￿(d0). ￿
Proof of proposition 10 (probabilistic sophistication II)
To show that ￿ is non-negative given axiom A.6￿ it is enough to show that H0
￿ is a supporting
hyperplane of %u at 0. Suppose not. Then there exists a state-utility function ~ u in H0
￿ such that
~ u ￿u 0. Since ￿ is nonatomic (or uniform) we can approximate ~ u by another state-utility function
u0 measurable with respect to some N-element partition fE1;:::ENg such that ￿ (Ej) = 1=N
for all j = 1;:::;N, and such that u0 ￿u 0. We can think of any state utility function that is
measurable with respect to this partition as an Ndimensional vector of ￿event-utilities￿ . Abusing
notation, let u0 also refer to its corresponding vector. By probabilistic sophistication and theorem
9, the vector u0 is indi⁄erent to all its permutations (since each induces the same distribution of
utilities according to ￿), and hence each such permutation ~ u0 is strictly preferred to 0. Since the
46distribution on the N element partition is uniform, each of these permutation vectors ~ u0 lie in
H0
￿. Hence the convex hull of these permutation vectors includes 0. By part 1 of theorem 2, there
exists ^ ￿ such that 0 %u u00 for all u00 in H0
^ ￿, measurable with respect to the partition. Thus, for








t > 0 for all ~ u0 which is a permutation of u0. But this contradicts 0 lying in
the convex hull of the permutation vectors.
The properties of ￿ in parts 2 and 3 of theorem 2 are immediate.
To show ￿ is symmetric, consider some N-element partition fE1;:::ENg such that ￿ (Ej) =
1=N for all j = 1;:::;N. Consider the utility-function ^ u measurable with respect to this partition,
which is equal to 1 on states in Ej, ￿1 on states in Ej0, and zero elsewhere. By construction ^ u and
￿^ u are both lie in H0
￿, and by probabilistic sophistication they are indi⁄erent. Moreover, since
^ u + (￿^ u) = 0, the underlying pair of acts constitute a symmetric pair. Let ^ ￿ be the probability
associated with the Vector Expected Utility representation. The construction of ^ ￿, and the fact
that ^ u ￿u u implies that ^ ￿ (Ej) = ^ ￿ (Ej0). Since the uniform partition and the elements of the
partition were arbitrary it follows that ￿ = ^ ￿, and so ￿(d) = ￿(￿d). ￿
Proof of theorem 11 (Dispersion Aversions) It is immediate that uncertainty aversion
implies common-mean uncertainty aversion. Example 5 illustrates that the converse is false. Ergin
& Gul (2009, Theorem 2 and by example after the proof of theorem 2) show that second-order
risk aversion implies issue preference but not the converse.
To see that common-mean uncertainty aversion implies second-order risk aversion, notice that
if an agent is second-order probabilistically sophisticated with respect to ￿, then ￿f = ￿g implies
f ￿ g. Moreover, if two acts f and g induce the same two-stage lottery with respect to ￿ then
they have the same mean act, i.e., E￿ (f) = E￿ (g), and hence E￿ (U ￿ f) = E￿ (U ￿ g); that is
f and g have a common mean with respect to ￿. Therefore if f and g satisfy the conditions of
second-order risk aversion they also satisfy those for common-mean uncertainty aversion.
To see that issue preference implies common-mean monotonicity, ￿x f and (using the fact that
the outcome space is rich) construct an act g that is degenerate in each second stage and that
induces the same utility vector as f. By our our substitution axiom A.4￿, g ￿ f. By construction,
47U (E￿ (f)) = E￿ (U ￿ f) = E￿ (U ￿ g) = U (E￿ (g)) and (again by our substitution axiom A.4￿),
￿g+(1 ￿ ￿)E￿ (g) ￿ ￿f+(1 ￿ ￿)E￿ (f). Since E￿ (￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ (g)) = E￿ (g), applying issue
preference, we get ￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ (g) % g. Hence ￿f + (1 ￿ ￿)E￿ (f) % f as required.
For mean-dispersion preferences, common mean monotonicity implies that ￿(d) ￿ ￿(￿d) for
all ￿ 2 (0;1) and any d in H0
￿. Therefore, by continuity, ￿(d) ￿ ￿(0) = 0, and, by part (a) of
theorem 10 this implies axiom A.6￿. ￿
B Appendix: Examples
Example 1 (mean-standard deviation preferences). Recall for some ￿xed ￿ 2 ￿(S), we
set ￿ S := fs 2 S : ￿ (s) > 0g. A monotone mean-dispersion preference relation can be constructed
by taking ￿(d) :=
p
￿￿ where ￿ =
qP
s ￿s (ds)
2 is the standard deviation and ￿ > 0 is such that
￿ < mins2￿ S (￿s=(1 ￿ ￿s)). It is immediate that the dispersion function is non-negative, linearly
homogeneous, symmetric and convex. From this it follows that the upper contour sets of the
induced preferences over state-contingent utility vectors are convex cones each with its vertex on
the constant-utility line. Hence, to show the preferences are monotonic it is su¢ cient to show that









￿s (1 ￿ ￿s)(U (x) ￿ U (y))






￿s (1 ￿ ￿s)
￿
(U (x) ￿ U (y))




￿s (1 ￿ ￿s) > 0, that is, ￿ < ￿s=(1 ￿ ￿s). ￿
Example 2 (value at risk preferences). To show these have a CEU representation: ￿x ￿ in
(0;1) and consider the capacity




0 if ￿ (E) ￿ ￿
1 if ￿ (E) > ￿
.
Since the state space is ￿nite and hence d is a ￿nite dimensional vector, the Choquet integral of










(i) for any t < inf
￿
^ t 2 R : ￿
￿￿





￿V aR￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) ￿ tg) ￿ ￿V aR￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) > tg) = 1 ￿ 1 = 0;
(ii) for t = inf
￿
^ t 2 R : ￿
￿￿





￿V aR￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) ￿ tg) ￿ ￿V aR￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) > tg) = 1 ￿ 0 = 1;
(iii) for any t > inf
￿
^ t 2 R : ￿
￿￿





￿V aR￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) ￿ tg) ￿ ￿V aR￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) > tg) = 0 ￿ 0 = 0.
Hence,
Z
(d)d￿V aR￿ = inf ft 2 R : ￿ (fs 2 S : d(s) ￿ tg) > ￿g = ￿V aR￿ (d).
Example 3 (conditional value at risk preferences). To show these have a CEU representa-
tion: ￿x ￿ in (0;1). We established above that



































Example 4 (generalized Gini dispersion preferences.) As we observed in our discussion of





denote a reordering of the elements of this vector, for which u[j] ￿ u[j+1],
for j = 1;:::;n ￿ 1, then it readily follows that corresponding W (u) for these mean-dispersion



















Siniscalchi (2009, Table II, p826) provides the following necessary and su¢ cient condition for
a CEU representation to admit a symmetric mean-dispersion representation. For all E ￿ S,
























This functional equation only holds for ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 2. ￿
Example 6 (multiplier preferences.) Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006b) show that
we can write Hansen-Sargent multiplier preferences as V (f) = ￿￿ln[
P
s exp(￿U (f (s))=￿)￿s].
To convert this into a mean-dispersion representation, add and subtract E￿ (U ￿ f) to the right
hand side, to obtain,










where, as usual, d 2 H0
￿ is the vector of ￿ di⁄erences from the mean￿given by ds := U (f (s)) ￿



















and ￿(0) = 0. Hence (2) constitutes a mean-dispersion representation of the multiplier preferences.
To see that it is not symmetric, recall that the third-order Taylor approximation of exp(t)
around t = 0, is given by
exp(t) ￿ 1 + t + t2=2 + t3=6.
Hence









































s 6= 0, ￿(d) 6= ￿(￿d). ￿
Example 7 (Hurwicz ￿-MEU preferences). Consider the CEU preferences characterized by
U and the ￿ Hurwicz capacity￿￿ given by
￿ (E) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if E = ?
￿ if E = 2 f?;Sg
1 if E = S
, where ￿ ￿ 1=n.
This capacity ￿ is not convex since for any pair of distinct states s0 and s00, we have ￿ (fs0g) +






us + (1 ￿ ￿)min
s2S
us
= ￿ + ￿max
s2S











=n and d = u0 ￿ ￿e. It remains to show that the Choquet integral of
the d with respect to the Hurwicz capacity ￿ is non-positive. To see this, consider the uniform
probability vector, ^ ￿ = (1=n;:::;1=n). Since ￿ ￿ 1=n, the vector ^ ￿ is an element of the core
C associated with ￿ since for any A ￿ S,
P
s2A ^ ￿s = jAj=n ￿ ￿ (A). Hence we have, for every
d 2 H0
^ ￿,


















To see that for n > 2, this dispersion function is not symmetric, consider the dispersion vector d,
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